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THE USE AND ABUSE OF
LABOR’S CAPITAL
DAVID H. WEBBER*
The recent financial crisis has jeopardized the retirement savings of twenty-seven
million Americans who depend on public pension funds, leading to cuts in benefits,
increased employee contributions, job losses, and the rollback of legal rights like
collective bargaining. This Article examines ways in which public pension funds
invest against the economic interests of their own participants and beneficiaries, and
the legal implications of these investments. In particular, the Article focuses on the
use of public pensions to fund privatization of public employee jobs. Under the
ascendant—and flawed—interpretation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, public pen-
sion trustees owe their allegiance to the fund itself, rather than to the fund’s partici-
pants and beneficiaries, notwithstanding the fact that the duty of loyalty commands
trustees to invest “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries”
according to ERISA and similar state pension codes. I argue that this “fund-first”
view distorts the duty of loyalty and turns the role of trustee on its head, leading to
investments that undermine, rather than enhance, the economic interests of public
employees. I turn to ERISA, trust law, agency law, and corporate law to argue that
public pension trustees should consider the impact of the funds’ investments on the
jobs and job security of the funds’ participants and beneficiaries, where relevant. I
also adduce evidence that these controversial investments are widespread. I propose
that public pension funds be governed by a “member-first” view of fiduciary duty
focused on the economic interests of public employees in their retirement funds,
which go beyond maximizing return to the funds. I argue that this view is more
faithful to the original purpose of the duty of loyalty than is the fund-first view. I
suggest ways to implement the member-first view, discuss potential extensions
beyond the jobs impact of investments, and assess the proposed reform’s practical
effects.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2108 R
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR
PUBLIC PENSION TRUSTEES: FUNCTIONING IN ERISA’S
SHADOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2119 R
* Copyright © 2014 by David H. Webber, Associate Professor, Boston University
School of Law. E-mail: dhwebber@bu.edu. I thank Jack Beermann, Martin Braun, Alan
Feld, William Fornia, Tamar Frankel, Joshua Getzler, Matt Goldin, Michael Harper, Maria
O’Brien Hylton, Marcel Kahan, Ian Lanoff, Brendan Maher, Michael Meurer, Nancy
Moore, Frank Partnoy, Eric Roiter, Paul Rose, Paul Secunda, David Seipp, Natalya
Shnitser, Damon Silvers, Irit Tau-Webber, David I. Walker, Kathryn Zeiler, and com-
menters at the 2014 National Business Law Scholars Conference, the Conference on Dis-
tressed Municipal Financing: Navigating Uncharted Waters, Boston University Law School
(2014), the 2013 Canadian Law and Economics Association Conference, and the Boston
University Law School Faculty Workshop. I am grateful to Arcangelo Cella, Caroline
Holda, Krystyna Marini, Joanne Oleksyk, Eric Schlichte, Stuart Duncan Smith, and Daniel
Warren for excellent research assistance.
2106
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2380661 





      12/19/2014   13:53:46
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\89-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 2 19-DEC-14 11:58
December 2014] THE USE AND ABUSE OF LABOR’S CAPITAL 2107
A. ERISA’s Duty of Loyalty and the Exclusive Purpose
Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2122 R
B. The Exclusive Purpose Rule Should Not Unduly
Limit Consideration of the Broader Economic
Interests of Plan Participants and Beneficiaries in
Plan Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2126 R
C. The Inadequacy of the “Investments of Equal Value
Rule” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2142 R
D. Under a Member-First View, Trustee Discretion Is
Still Constrained by the Duties of Impartiality,
Prudence, and Diversification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2147 R
1. The Duty of Impartiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2147 R
2. Duties of Prudence and Diversification . . . . . . . . . . 2152 R
E. Even Under a Fund-First View, the Investment
Impact of Layoffs and Future Hiring Should Be
Evaluated by Trustees in Making Investment
Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2157 R
II. CRITIQUING THE TRUST LAW MODEL FOR PUBLIC
PENSION FUNDS: A COMPARATIVE AGENCY COST
ANALYSIS OF TRUSTS, PRIVATE PENSIONS, AND PUBLIC
PENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2160 R
A. The Problem of Applying Trust Law to Employee
Benefit Plans Generally and Public Pension Funds
in Particular: Insights from Agency Law and
Corporate Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2161 R
III. IMPLEMENTING A MEMBER-FIRST VIEW OF THE DUTY
OF LOYALTY AND ASSESSING ITS PRACTICAL
EFFECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2168 R
A. How a Shift to a Member-First View of Fiduciary
Duty Alters the Informational Environment in Which
Investment Decisions Are Made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2169 R
1. Exit or Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2171 R
a. Boycott or Divestment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2173 R
b. The “Wall Street Walk” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2177 R
2. Voice or Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2183 R
3. Proactive Job Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2185 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2186 R
APPENDIX: COMPARISON OF ERISA AND STATE PENSION
CODE EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2188 R





      12/19/2014   13:53:46
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\89-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 3 19-DEC-14 11:58
2108 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:2106
INTRODUCTION
For twenty-two years, Rick Thorne worked as a custodian in the
public schools of Chelmsford, Massachusetts.1 He earned $20 an hour
“cleaning floors, cutting grass, and setting up for assemblies,”2 and
made biweekly payments to his retirement fund, the Middlesex
County Retirement System (Middlesex). Middlesex’s assets were (and
still are) invested through the Massachusetts Pension Reserves Invest-
ment Trust (MassPRIT).3 In December 2007, Thorne’s retirement
assets, along with those of his fellow Chelmsford school employees,
and other public employees across the state, were directed by Mass-
PRIT to fund the acquisition of Aramark Corp. (Aramark) by a pri-
vate equity pool.4 Aramark is a “global food-service and facility-
management company” that focuses on, among other businesses, ser-
vicing public school districts.5 In March 2011, Aramark won the custo-
dial contract for the Chelmsford school district after underbidding
Thorne’s union.6 Aramark offered Thorne and his fellow custodians
their jobs back for $8.75 an hour—a fifty-six percent salary cut—equal
to what Thorne earned when he started at Chelmsford in 1989.7
Thorne declined the offer and was fired.8 He now collects a substan-
tially reduced pension from Middlesex, diminished by his abbreviated
career.9
Job losses and pension reductions can be harmful to anyone.
They can be particularly damaging to public employees because mil-
lions of them, including most Massachusetts public employees, forty
percent of public school teachers across the country, and two-thirds of
all public-safety employees, are ineligible for Social Security because
1 Martin Z. Braun & William Selway, Pension Fund Gains Mean Worker Pain as




4 See id. (noting that MassPRIT is an owner of Aramark).
5 Id.; School Districts, ARAMARK, http://www.aramark.com/Industries/SchoolDistricts/
(last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (noting that Aramark provides more than 500 school districts
with food, custodial, and maintenance services).
6 Braun & Selway, supra note 1.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Telephone Interview with Martin Z. Braun, Public Finance Reporter, Bloomberg
News (Aug. 7, 2013) (based on notes from Martin Braun’s interview with Rick Thorne); see
also, e.g., MASS. STATE RET. BD., BENEFIT GUIDE FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS STATE
EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM 4 (2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/treasury/
docs/retirement/retguide.pdf [hereinafter MASS. BENEFIT GUIDE] (calculating public
pension benefits based on salary and years of service).
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of their public pensions.10 Those pensions are often all they have to
sustain them in retirement.11
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
requires fund trustees to prioritize the interests of fund participants
and beneficiaries in making investments.12 As addressed more fully
below, ERISA does not apply to public pension funds, but it is author-
itatively cited to interpret the fiduciary duties embedded in state pen-
sion codes. ERISA and state pension fiduciary duties share the same
trust law ancestry; on occasion, state codes simply copy ERISA’s
10 Most public employees in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts do not participate in
Social Security. See Social Security Coverage, NAT’L ASS’N ST. RET. ADMINISTRATORS,
http://www.nasra.org/socialsecurity (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (discussing public pension
fund recipients’ participation in Social Security in Massachusetts). Nationwide,
approximately one-fourth of public sector employees do not participate in Social Security,
including over one-third of public school teachers and two-thirds of firefighters, police
officers, and first responders. See 42 U.S.C. § 410 (a)(7) (2012) (excluding state employees
from Social Security by default); Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare v. Snell, 416 F.2d 840,
841 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating that state employees were excluded in order to avoid
constitutional issues with Social Security); Social Security Coverage, supra (discussing
public pension fund recipients’ participation in Social Security nationwide).
11 See Jack M. Beerman, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 4–9
(2013) (discussing pensions and recent trends in employee benefit law).
12 Plan “participants” refers to current workers who are “either employees in, or
reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment . . . or former employees who
have . . . a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment or who have a
colorable claim to vested benefits”; plan “beneficiaries” refers to “person[s] designated by
a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who [are] or may become
entitled to a benefit thereunder.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 107,
117 (1989) (citations omitted). I refer to plan participants and beneficiaries collectively as
plan “members”. The Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act
of 1997 (UMPERSA) is designed for public pension funds but has only been adopted in
two states, Wyoming and Maryland. Legislative Enactment Status, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeMap.aspx?title=Management%20of
%20Public%20Employee%20Retirement%20Systems%20Act (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
The UMPERSA language substantially tracks the ERISA language discussed in this
Article. See UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMP. RET. SYS. ACT § 7 (1997) (establishing the duty of
loyalty and exclusive purpose rule). The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) has a duty
of loyalty, and requires a trustee to operate the trust “solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries.” UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 5 (1994). The Uniform Prudent
Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) does not have a duty of loyalty,
although it reminds trustees that the duty of loyalty applies through other law, and
explicitly permits a trustee to consider “an asset’s special relationship or special value, if
any, to the charitable purposes of the institution.” See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(b) (2006) (the duty of loyalty is imposed by other laws and
must be complied with); see also id. § 3(e)(1)(H) (trustee may consider “an asset’s special
relationship”). The UPMIFA does not explicitly have an exclusive purpose rule, but the
notes to the UPMIFA provide an example: A university could buy land next to the campus
for future development, and, even though it may not conform to “prudent investor
standards,” it could be appropriate because the university needs to build a new dorm. Id.
§ 2 cmt. at 10. Although that example is geared toward the prudent investor rule, it could
also be applicable to the exclusive purpose rule.
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duties.13 This stands in sharp contrast to the usual pattern, in which
there may be sharp divergences between ERISA and state pension
codes over issues like funding requirements, disclosure and reporting
requirements, pension vesting and eligibility, and other key features of
pension governance. I discuss interpretations of ERISA fiduciary
duties not to endorse the application of those interpretations to public
pension funds, but to provide the relevant legal background for
assessing the fiduciary duties of public pension trustees. Under the
ascendant view of ERISA and state fiduciary duties, consideration of
the impact of a fund’s investments on the jobs of fund participants is
worse than irrelevant; it is considered to be a breach of the duty of
loyalty and the exclusive purpose rule.14 This is because the dominant
interpretation of the fiduciary duties of public pension trustees
requires them to prioritize the investment impact on the fund alone,
and not its impact on the funds’ participants and beneficiaries, like
Thorne.15 Even in the extreme case, in which an investment by a
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2012) (exempting governmental plans from ERISA); see,
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 215.47(10) (2011) (“The [Florida State Board of Administration] shall
discharge its duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of its participants and
beneficiaries. The board . . . shall comply with the fiduciary standards set forth in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act . . . .”); see also CAL. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 17(a)–(d) (mirroring ERISA’s exclusive purpose and prudent person rules and the duty
of diversification in California); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11:834(B) (2009) (requiring
Louisiana public retirement system trustees to follow the exclusive purpose rule); id.
§ 11:263(A)–(B) (requiring Louisiana public retirement system trustees to follow the
prudent person rule); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 502(3) (McKinney 2014) (requiring the New York
state teachers’ retirement system to follow the exclusive purpose rule as stated in ERISA);
71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5931(a), (e) (2014) (requiring Pennsylvania public pension trustees to
comply with the exclusive purpose and prudent person rules); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 825.101 (West 2014) (mirroring ERISA’s exclusive purpose rule in Texas); Bd. of Trs. of
the Vill. of Barrington Police Fund v. Dep’t of Ins., 570 N.E.2d 622, 626 (1991) (noting that
Illinois Pension Code is analogous to ERISA); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11,
§ 136-2.3(a) (2011) (mirroring ERISA’s prudent person rule in New York); EMP. BENEFITS
RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 20 (2005), available
at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/Fnd05.Prt05.Chp41.pdf (“But
while many ERISA provisions do not always apply to retirement plans of state and local
governments, those requirements may indirectly influence plan design and administration
in areas ranging from investment and fiduciary standards to pension rights of surviving
spouses.” (citations omitted)). For more on this, see infra Appendix.
14 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1) (2006) (establishing the exclusive purpose rule);
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,731 (Oct.
17, 2008) (finding that, when creating an investment policy, fiduciaries must consider only
the economic interest of plan participants and beneficiaries).
15 Comprehensive assessment of the particular rules and regulations of each state’s
pension code is beyond the scope of this Article. In the case of MassPRIT, the fund is
managed by the Massachusetts Pension Retirement Investment Management Board
(MassPRIM) whose mission statement—crafted by the Board itself, and not the state
legislature—includes the goal of maximizing return on investment (ROI) for the fund. See
MASS. PENSION FUND INV. MGMT. BD., INVESTMENT POLICY 1 (2012), available at http://
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public pension fund in a company that competes with public
employees is the proximate cause of the employees’ loss of employ-
ment, the employees’ lost compensation or benefits is irrelevant to the
fiduciary analysis. Likewise, this “fund-first” view inhibits funds from
negotiating with investee management to safeguard the jobs of the
funds’ participants, on the assumption that minimizing the employ-
ment impact of an investment would reduce returns to the fund.
This fund-first view of fiduciary duty was well-expressed by Phil
Griffith, the chief investment officer of the Teachers’ Retirement
System of Louisiana (Louisiana Teachers), which also owns a substan-
tial stake in an Aramark owner.16 In 2010, “Aramark was hired to run
food service for the Recovery School District, which took over
Orleans Parish schools after the city was devastated by Hurricane
Katrina.”17 As it did in Chelmsford, the company cut pay for Loui-
siana Teachers participants like Carol Sanders, a cook who had
worked for Orleans Parish since 1982.18 Before the Aramark contract,
Sanders “had medical benefits, paid days off and was making $15 an
hour.”19 Aramark “cut Sanders’s time on the job in half, to 20 hours a
week, leaving her working split shifts—2 hours in the morning and 2
more into the early afternoon, five days a week. Her pay dropped to
$9 an hour.”20 Sanders “went without medical insurance and began
drawing $200 a week in food stamps.”21 Eventually, she was fired.22
According to Griffith, in considering an investment like the one made
by the Louisiana Teachers in Aramark:
We take a kind of hands-off approach, which is from a fiduciary
responsibility . . . . We manage [the fund] for return and for our own
constituents. We don’t get into, ‘Does that mean it lays off public
www.mapension.com/files/5313/2752/7256/Investment_Policy_-_01252012.pdf (stating the
MassPRIT investment policy and mission statement); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32,
§§ 22–23 (2011) (establishing MassPRIT and MassPRIM). Thus, the fiduciary question
assessed in this paper might manifest in slightly different ways depending on the state and
the fund. Here, it might manifest in Middlesex’s decision to opt into a fund like MassPRIT
that maximizes ROI for the fund, or MassPRIM’s decision to adopt a policy favoring
maximum ROI while also purportedly being bound to the duty of loyalty. It might also
manifest in the tension between a state regulation requiring ROI and also adoption of
traditional fiduciary duties. It could also manifest as a policy question as to whether funds
should adopt such a policy, or act as if current law requires it.
16 See Braun & Selway, supra note 1 (quoting Griffith as saying Louisiana TRS chooses
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workers?’ The only thing we look at is the security of the trust, not
whether or not it creates jobs or takes away jobs, whether it be
public employees in Louisiana or public employees throughout the
country . . . . Our responsibility is to the trust . . . .23
Under this view, if the Aramark investment had been screened
out by Louisiana Teachers because of its potentially detrimental
impact on the jobs of fund participants, or if Louisiana Teachers
divested from Aramark in favor of a slightly less profitable investment
that had no negative impact on participant jobs, then Louisiana
Teachers trustees would have breached their fiduciary duties because
the first investment is better for the fund, even if the net economic
benefit to fund participants and beneficiaries would have been greater
under the second investment. Under this same view, trustees might
similarly breach their fiduciary duties by negotiating to protect their
participants’ jobs at some cost to return on investment, even if it
would improve the investment’s net economic benefit to fund partici-
pants and beneficiaries.
This dilemma is hardly limited to the investments made in
Aramark by Middlesex/MassPRIT and Louisiana Teachers. For virtu-
ally every public sector function at the state, county, and municipal
levels, there is a private sector industry seeking to perform it.24 There
are private prisons, private ambulance corps, private hospitals, private
sanitation services, private police and fire services, private schools and
privately run public school service companies, private security forces,
private infrastructure services, and more.25 Because the fund-first
view of fiduciary duty effectively bars meaningful consideration of fac-
tors like participant employment when making investments, and
because public pension fund holdings are usually publicly unavail-
able,26 there is little direct data available to place the scope of the
23 Id.
24 See Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing
Public Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 477–78 (2012) (“[E]verything that is done
in the public sector can (and sometimes is) performed by the private sector.”).
25 Id.
26 Although the SEC requires funds with greater than $100 million in assets to disclose
their holdings quarterly on Form 13F, such forms are rarely filed by public pension funds
themselves, and instead are filed by their outside investment managers. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13f-1(a)(1) (2011) (requiring institutional investors with at least $100 million in assets
to file Form 13F); see also SEC Staff Answers Frequently Asked Questions About Form
13F, SEC TODAY, Apr. 21, 1999, available at 2013 WL 37575 (indicating that investment
managers with “investment discretion over $100 million or more of ‘section 13(f)’
securities” usually file Form 13F). These managers rarely if ever delineate which of their
holdings belong to which clients. Consequently, it is nearly impossible for the public to
ascertain the content of public pension fund portfolios.
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problem in context. But certain straightforward empirical observa-
tions may still be made.
On the one hand, it must be conceded that the portfolios of these
funds are so enormous, with over $3 trillion in assets under manage-
ment,27 that any particular investment issue appears small relative to
the whole. Only a fraction of total public pension fund assets are
invested in projects that undermine participant jobs. On the other
hand, it is likely that many, if not most, public pension funds them-
selves are invested in businesses that directly undermine the employ-
ment security of their own participants—or are likely to do so in the
future. These investments may well lower the cost of capital for those
businesses, exacerbating the problem both for the participants and
beneficiaries themselves and for the funds that lose participant and
employer contributions. This observation follows from the fact that
public pension funds are diversified investors with substantial assets
and that virtually none of the nearly four thousand public pension
funds in the United States deploy screening mechanisms to track this
issue.28 Public pension funds make up thirty-seven percent of the
assets of private equity player Blackstone, suggesting that
Blackstone’s competitors may also manage substantial public
employee retirement funds, and suggesting that such dollars may play
an important role in financing privatizing investments.29 In total,
“public pensions have sunk about $435 billion into private-equity
firms, almost a third of total investments in the industry . . . .”30 It also
follows from a handful of instances in which the issue has emerged
publicly, several of which I discuss in this Article. In addition to their
economic impact, which I assess in detail, these investments create
considerable distrust and resentment between the funds’ participants
and beneficiaries (for simplicity, “members”) and their trustees, in
some instances leading to public campaigns or litigation threats
against the latter.31
27 See 2011 Annual Survey of Public Pensions: State and Local Data, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/govs/retire/historical_data_2011.html (last visited Nov.
17, 2014) (showing total investments by state pension funds).
28 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 STUDY OF PUBLIC PENSIONS: STATE & LOCAL
DATA (2012) (showing 227 state and 3771 local defined benefit public pension plans).
29 See infra Part III.A.1.b (discussing Blackstone’s complex interactions with public
pension funds). For an account of one public pension fund’s relationship with Blackstone,
see CHRIS TOBE, KENTUCKY FRIED PENSIONS: A CULTURE OF COVER-UPS AND
CORRUPTION 110 (2013).
30 Braun & Selway, supra note 1.
31 See Matt Taibbi, Who Can Stop the Koch Brothers from Buying the Tribune Papers?
Unions Can, and Should, ROLLING STONE (May 10, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/
politics/news/who-can-stop-the-koch-brothers-from-buying-the-tribune-papers-unions-can-
and-should-20130510 (quoting Liz Greenwood, LACERA trustee, on union campaign
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It is not difficult to discern why businesses that compete against
public employees would attract investments. Private sector actors can
perform these functions profitably and for lower cost than their public
sector equivalents—at least in the short term—when they can pay
workers twenty-five to seventy-five percent less than what they were
earning as public employees, and when they may provide lower
quality services with fewer workers.32 Others have pointed out that
private sector competition creates more nimble enterprises that
respond quickly to changing conditions, including deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions like the recent downturn, giving them advantages
over public sector employers like the ability to reduce costs and avoid
the moral hazard of promising benefits that others will pay.33
Regardless, when public employees lose their jobs, or have their
hours and compensation reduced, taxpayers cushion some of the blow
when necessity drives the employees to seek public assistance, as did
Sanders.34 These investments are also politically attractive to elected
officials who are themselves public pension trustees, or who appoint
them, and who believe in reducing the size of the public sector or
undercutting public employees or their unions. Such politicians have
directed public employee retirement assets to fund companies that
will compete against public employees for their jobs; I discuss an
example of this below in Part I.C, where I examine the outright
purchase of the ailing Edison Schools Company—a company that
competes with teachers—by the Florida Retirement System, half of
against pension investments in private ambulance companies that compete with members);
see also Brian K. Miller, CalPERS Changing PPP Language, GLOBEST.COM (Aug. 15,
2008), http://www.globest.com/news/9_159/sanfrancisco/CalPERS-Changing-PPP-Lan
guage-173101.html (describing threatened lawsuit by members in similar circumstances).
32 See Privatization Myths Debunked, PUB. INT. (2013), http://www.inthepublicinterest
.org/node/457 (stating that private companies often perform lower quality service than
public contractors and that many private employees earn less than the federal poverty
level); see also Hylton, supra note 24, at 433–34 (discussing generous benefits provided to
public sector employees); David Yarden, Prisons, Profits, and the Private Sector Solution,
21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 327 (1994) (book review) (discussing lower operating costs and
wage costs for tasks performed by private sector actors); Jeffrey H. Keefe, Are Wisconsin
Public Employees Overcompensated? 2–3 (EPI Briefing Paper No. 290, Feb. 10, 2011),
available at http://epi.3cdn.net/9e237c56096a8e4904_rkm6b9hn1.pdf (arguing that because
the private sector cannot mirror public sector jobs, fundamental personal characteristics
and labor market skills are the appropriate criteria to measure an employee’s worth rather
than a public/private job comparison); Randy Ludlow, Vendor Fined $142,100 for Prison-
Meal Problems, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 19, 2014, 4:53 AM), available at http://www
.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/04/18/prison_meals.html (noting that Aramark
was fined by the State of Ohio for “failing to hire enough workers to prepare and serve
meals”).
33 See Hylton, supra note 24, at 479 (comparing the responsiveness to changing
economic conditions of the private sector to that of the public sector).
34 Supra note 19–23 and accompanying text.
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whose assets are comprised of teacher retirement funds. Such invest-
ments fulfill these elected officials’ ideological commitments to
reducing the size of the public sector and undermining public
employees and/or their unions. The rise of this new class of politician/
trustees who are actively interested in undermining public pension
funds and their beneficiaries poses a new challenge for the legal archi-
tecture that is designed to protect those beneficiaries. It requires
rethinking the recent evolution of the relevant legal protections and
whether they cohere with their original purpose, which was to priori-
tize the economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries in
fund investments.
This problem is the focus of this Article. Whether outsourcing
public sector jobs to the private sector is socially desirable, whether it
would raise or lower net social welfare, is not the subject here. The
primary question addressed here is whether the legal concept of fidu-
ciary duty requires public employees to invest in, and effectively subsi-
dize, their own demise. One can take the view that outsourcing jobs to
the private sector is socially beneficial while also concluding that
investment of public employee retirement savings in these businesses
without considering the impact on participant employment is inconsis-
tent with fiduciary duty (in particular the duty of loyalty), that it
depresses the cost of capital for these private sector businesses, and
that it directly harms the economic interests of the plan participants
and beneficiaries, undermining the purpose of a trustee fiduciary in
the first place.
This Article critiques the fund-first view of fiduciary duty and
advocates instead for a “member-first” view in the investment con-
text. I argue that, in connection with fund investments, public pension
trustees’ fiduciary duties run to the participants and beneficiaries
themselves, and not to the fund alone.35 I argue that this distinction
35 In this Article, I advocate a member-first view based on fund members’ economic
interests in plan investments. In the English cases, Cowan v. Scargill, [1985] Ch. 270, 287,
and Harries v. Church Comm’rs for Eng., [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1241, 1246–47 (Ch.), the English
Chancery Court held that a trustee must consider the beneficiaries’ financial interests and
the purpose of the trust. In Cowan, the court found that the defendant trustees breached
their fiduciary duties in making an investment to advance the interests of the union, rather
than the fund participants and beneficiaries themselves. Cowan, [1985] Ch. at 294. There is
a tradition that goes beyond looking to member economic interests in fund investments to
encompass member dignitary interests. See infra notes 297–98 and accompanying text
(discussing boycott strategies based on the idea that investment in objectionable sectors
causes a dignitary harm to pension fund members); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280–81 (1999)
(arguing for an approach to corporate decision making taking into account parties affected
besides the shareholders in order to increase productivity); Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The
Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 56 ARIZ.
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makes a real difference, and that a member-first view comes closer to
the original purpose and meaning of the duty of loyalty. The practical
significance of adopting a member-first instead of a fund-first view of
fiduciary duty is not that investments like those described above
would be barred outright, but that the impact of the investment on
fund participant jobs would become part of the primary investment
analysis. Once that occurs, investments that appear to be the most
attractive based on their benefits to the fund alone may turn out not
to be in the economic interests of fund members. This could affect
both the actual investment practices of public pension funds and the
informational environment in which they operate. I offer three pri-
mary arguments in favor of this member-first view: a textualist argu-
ment, an agency costs argument, and a practical argument suggesting
how a member-first view could be deployed and why it could be
expected to have an impact on investment behavior and on saving
jobs.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I offer a textual anal-
ysis of the duty of loyalty and the exclusive purpose rule under both
trust law and ERISA. I argue that, contrary to the interpretation
offered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and some courts, the
plain text of the exclusive purpose rule does not command a fund-first
view of fiduciary duty, and that it can (and should) accommodate a
member-first view. I also demonstrate that there is a line of cases
holding that the fiduciary duties of trustees run directly to the fund’s
participants and beneficiaries, and not just to the fund alone, that at
least one line of cases addressing below-market rate loans made by
plans to plan members implicitly supports this member-first view in
the investment context (as opposed to the benefits context), and that
one state case approves trustee consideration of the jobs impact of
trustee decision-making.36 These cases, at a minimum, complicate our
understanding of the duty of loyalty and the exclusive purpose rule,
opening the door to a member-first view and undermining the claim
by DOL and others that the “plain text” means “fund-first.” I further
argue that the member-first view in connection with plan investments
is a better fit for the duty of loyalty than the fund-first view because
the traditional focus of the duty of loyalty has been to force trustees to
prioritize the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries over the
interests of either the trustees themselves or of third parties, not to
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2406032 (discussing the benefits of SEC regulations taking into account a society wide
cost-benefit analysis, rather than only investor welfare).
36 See Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586, 588 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that trustees did not
violate their fiduciary duties by making below-market-rate loans to plan participants).
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delineate a hierarchy between different economic interests of mem-
bers. I also critique the narrow way in which DOL’s interpretation
permits “extraneous” considerations like employment only when
selecting between investments of “equal value,” a limitation which in
practice eliminates consideration of this most vital economic interest
of fund members.37 I demonstrate that the member-first view is still a
substantial constraint on trustee discretion, not only because it forces
trustees to prioritize the economic interests of plan members, but
because trustees remain bound by the duties of impartiality, prudence,
and diversification. I conclude my textualist analysis by arguing that
participant jobs ought to be taken into account even under a fund-first
view.
In Part II, I step away from textualist arguments to assess policy
reasons why a member-first view is appropriate for public pension
funds. I compare the agency costs of trusts, private pension funds, and
public pension funds. I argue that application of trust law and ERISA
in the public pension context ought to be sensitive to the differing sets
of costs these bodies of law address. In particular, I argue that a
member-first view of the duty of loyalty does not raise the same
agency cost concerns in the public pension context that more broadly
interpreted duties might in the trust or even in the private fund con-
texts.38 That is because three aspects of public pension funds distin-
guish them from typical trusts and certain private ERISA funds: (1)
unlike the corporate sponsors of single-employer private pension
funds, the state and municipal sponsors of public pension funds are
not subject to the market for corporate control and are not merged
into or acquired by other entities; consequently, it is not necessary for
the legal architecture to guard against the particularly acute agency
costs that manifest in the mergers and acquisitions context39 (such as
37 Some public pensions have adopted the “equal value” rule. See, e.g., Letter of
Advice to Ted Wheeler, State Treasurer, No. OP-2010-3 (Or. Attorney Gen. Aug. 5, 2010),
available at 2010 WL 3200169, at *9 (explaining Oregon policy of looking to ERISA for
equal value investments); 93 Md. Op. Atty. Gen. 168 (2008), available at 2008 WL 5501279,
at *9 n.17 (comparing the similarity of Maryland’s standards to ERISA’s “truly equal”
requirement).
38 See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1988) (“The stricter fiduciary rules
of trust law mimic the contractual terms that the settlors and trustees would have agreed
upon if the costs of negotiating and enforcing such contracts were zero.”); Lee-ford Tritt,
The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
2579, 2592–93 (agency costs are “the costs that stem from an assumed misalignment of the
interests of principal and agent,” such as the assumption that agents act in their own
interest before the principal’s).
39 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 112 (1965) (discussing the market for corporate control and the value
associated with certain types of mergers). The market for corporate control has often been
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the threat that corporate management will exploit the employee pen-
sion to fend off a hostile offer); (2) in contrast to private trusts, public
pension funds operate in public where they can be monitored more
easily (though they perhaps are not subject to as much disclosure as
they should be ideally);40 and (3) public pension fund participants and
beneficiaries often elect representative peers to serve on fund boards
of trustees, reducing the types of monitoring concerns ordinarily faced
in a private trust.41 For these reasons, some of the ordinary agency
cost concerns one might find in a private trust or even a private pen-
sion plan may not exist in the public pension context or may exist in
different form. Therefore, the shift from a fund-first to a member-first
view of the duty of loyalty raises fewer agency cost concerns in the
public pension context than it might elsewhere.42
Finally, in Part III, I discuss how a member-first view of fiduciary
duty should be implemented and assess the practical implications of
such a shift. I argue that the member-first view will alter the informa-
tion environment, requiring disclosure and assessment of the jobs
impact of fund investments. This new information environment may
itself affect investor and investee behavior. I then consider how public
pension funds ought to respond to this information, contemplating
primarily the case in which a fund is invested, or plans to invest, in a
project whose negative jobs impact outweighs its superior returns. I
thought to lower agency costs, although that view has been challenged. Conversely, the
absence of such a market for public pension fund control might raise the agency costs of
public pension trustees. Plans sponsored by multiple employers are subject to additional
protections, mainly in that employers who withdraw from supporting the plan are subject
to withdrawal liability equal to their share of unfunded vested benefits. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1381 (2012) (listing the conditions for withdrawal liability); Chi. Truck Drivers v. El Paso
CGP Co., 525 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2008) (commenting that liquidated damages could be
imposed under withdrawal liability).
40 See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 822 (1993) (describing the public nature of public
pension fund operations).
41 See David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical
Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
187, 195–98 (2005) (discussing the reduced agency costs when pension beneficiaries elect
plan members to serve on the board); Romano, supra note 40, at 821 (characterizing the
correlation between improved pension fund performance and elected beneficiary board
members as consistent with literature indicating the correlation between corporate
performance and management owned equity). In terms of participant or beneficiary
representation on fund boards, Taft-Hartley plans are more similar to public pension plans
than are single employer plans in that they have boards of trustees composed of equal
representation of labor and management. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (2012).
42 For an interesting parallel discussion weighing the costs and benefits of moving from
a constrained to an unconstrained prudent man rule, foreshadowing the shift from the
prudent person to the prudent investor rule, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling
Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 88–94 (1987).
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analyze pension choices in this situation using a familiar framework of
investor choice: exit, voice, and proactive jobs creation, arguing that
these tools can be brought to bear to protect jobs. In particular, I
argue that under a member-first view, public pension funds could con-
sider the potential risk to their employees of investing in companies
that privatize public sector jobs—even if the investee is not actively
bidding against the fund’s own members—as long as the fund credibly
believes that the investment poses a future threat to its members.
Thus, a powerhouse fund like the California Public Employees’
Retirement System (CalPERS) could exit or exercise voice with an
investee that competes with workers’ jobs in New York, not in soli-
darity with those workers, but because the same company would likely
challenge CalPERS’s own members’ jobs in California. This would
substantially increase the pool of capital that could exit or exercise
voice over privatizing investments, and enhance the effectiveness of
my proposed reform. I also examine the handful of funds that have
attempted to implement policies that deal with the privatization issue.
I
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR
PUBLIC PENSION TRUSTEES: FUNCTIONING
IN ERISA’S SHADOW
An odd feature of the legal landscape for public pension fiduciary
duties is that any analysis usually begins by reference to an inappli-
cable federal statute, ERISA. ERISA established a comprehensive
legal regime governing employee benefit retirement and welfare
plans.43 ERISA covers several types of plans, including privately
funded “employee welfare benefit plans” and “employee pension ben-
efit plans.”44 The DOL is tasked with implementing the statute and
periodically issues advisory opinions offering its statutory interpreta-
43 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (ERISA preempts state laws governing employee
benefit plans not excepted elsewhere); Jay Youngdahl, The Time Has Come for a
Sustainable Theory of Fiduciary Duty in Investment, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 115,
120 (2011) (noting that Congress developed ERISA to create a unified body of law
governing employee benefit plans).
44 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2012) (defining employee welfare benefit plans as programs
funding benefits such as disability or medical care and employee pension benefit plans as
those that provide retirement income to employees or allow for employees to contribute
income to a retirement plan); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2012) (excluding federal, state, or
local government employee benefit plans, church pension plans, plans prepared to comply
with workmen’s compensation, unemployment or disability insurance laws, plans
maintained outside of the United States, or unfunded excess benefit plans); Roger C. Siske
et al., What’s New in Compensation Matters: A Summary of Current Case and Other
Developments, SD56 ALI-ABA 1, 150 (1999) (discussing specific types of benefit plans
subject to ERISA).
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tions.45 The Internal Revenue Service and the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation also play a role in shaping ERISA issues such as
funding and benefit accrual and termination insurance, and sections of
the tax code also copy ERISA.46 DOL also investigates criminal and
civil compliance with ERISA and compliance with the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, which gov-
erns unfair labor practices by employers or unions.47 ERISA does not
apply to public pension funds, and as noted in the Introduction, there
are many sharp distinctions between ERISA and state pension
codes.48 But there are a number of reasons why ERISA plays a large
role in the interpretation of state pension fiduciary duties, including
the traditional duty of loyalty embodied in the exclusive purpose
rule.49 First, many states share, or have even copied, ERISA’s fidu-
ciary duties to govern their own pension funds.50 This does not obli-
45 See 29 U.S.C. ch. 18, subch. II (2012) (codifying the administration of ERISA).
46 See Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 8–12
(2004) (discussing the interplay of ERISA, the PBGC, and the IRC as products of the
same statutory purpose).
47 See 29 U.S.C. § 1134 (2012) (delineating the investigatory powers of DOL with
respect to ERISA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 401 (2012) (describing the purpose of the Labor
Management Relations Act); 29 U.S.C. § 521 (2012) (describing the investigatory powers
of DOL with respect to the Labor Management Relations Act).
48 See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (exempting governmental plans from ERISA); Barnes v.
Barnes, No. 99-CO-20, 2000 WL 817082, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 2000) (holding that
Ohio public pension law does not allow the Qualified Domestic Relations Order
exemption that ERISA permits). For example, under ERISA, one may be both a fiduciary
and a settlor, which is expressly prohibited under trust law. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2012).
49 See EMP. BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PROGRAMS, PART FIVE: PUBLIC SECTOR 20 (2005), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/
publications/books/fundamentals/Fnd05.Prt05.Chp41.pdf (“But while many ERISA
provisions do not always apply to retirement plans of state and local governments, those
requirements may indirectly influence plan design and administration in areas ranging
from investment and fiduciary standards to pension rights of surviving spouses.”).
50 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Barrington Police Pension Fund v. Dep’t of Ins., 570 N.E.2d
622, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting that the Illinois Pension Code is analogous to ERISA);
see also CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(a)–(d) (mirroring ERISA’s exclusive purpose and
prudent man rules and the duty of diversification in California); FLA. STAT. § 215.47(10)
(2011) (“The board shall discharge its duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
its participants and beneficiaries. The board in performing the above investment duties
shall comply with the fiduciary standards set forth in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) through (C).”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 11:264.4 (2009) (requiring Louisiana public retirement system trustees to follow the
exclusive purpose rule); id. § 11:263(A)–(B) (requiring Louisiana public retirement system
trustees to follow the prudent man rule); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 502(3) (McKinney 2011)
(requiring the New York state teachers’ retirement system to follow the exclusive purpose
rule as stated in ERISA); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5931(a), (e) (2014) (requiring Pennsylvania
public pension trustees to comply with the exclusive purpose and prudent man rules); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 825.101 (West 2014) (mirroring ERISA’s exclusive purpose rule in
Texas); Honda ex rel. Kamakana v. Bd. of Trs. of Emps. Ret. Sys. of Haw., 120 P.3d 237
(Haw. 2005) (applying ERISA analysis for a public pension’s board of trustees’ fiduciary
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gate the states to defer to DOL or federal courts in construing their
own state fiduciary duties, much in the way that states may copy the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or share rules similar to it, but
deviate from federal court interpretations of those rules when
applying them as state rules in state court.51 Still, the shared language
governing public pension funds in states whose fiduciary duties mirror
ERISA’s makes DOL or federal court interpretations persuasive, if
not binding, and some state courts look to ERISA and federal cases
construing fiduciary duties when there is a dearth of state case law on
the subject.52 Similarly, pension attorneys regularly cite ERISA for
pension best practices, and advise their clients to follow such prac-
tices, both in states that have copied ERISA and in those that have
not.53 Thus, for public pension fund fiduciary duties, ERISA operates
as a type of shadow law, governing the funds’ conduct even though it
is both inapplicable and unenforceable against them.54
Therefore, I will begin my analysis with ERISA, inapplicable but
influential as it is. As discussed below, an ERISA interpretive bulletin
issued by DOL unduly restricts, if not eliminates, the proper consider-
ation of the economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries
in their jobs. Though I will argue that this analysis could apply to the
types of plans that are governed by ERISA, there are substantial dif-
ferences between such plans and public pension plans. DOL’s inter-
pretation of the duty of loyalty is a particularly bad fit for public
pension plans.55
duties); Wayne Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Wayne Cnty., 836 N.W.2d 279, 301 (Mich. Ct. App.
2013) (using an ERISA analysis to examine public pension fiduciary duties, while noting
ERISA is not binding); Bd. of Trs. of N.H. Judicial Ret. Plan v. Sec’y of State, 7 A.3d 1166
(N.H. 2010) (citing ERISA cases in analyzing public pension fiduciary duties due to their
common source in common law of trusts); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 136-
2.3(a) (2014) (mirroring ERISA’s prudent man rule in New York).
51 See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (exempting governmental plans from ERISA); see also
Bacigalupo v. Kohlhepp, 240 S.W.3d 155, 156 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are informative, but not binding on the state’s rules of civil
procedure).
52 See, e.g., Barrington, 570 N.E.2d at 626 (“[G]iven the lack of Illinois case law
construing the relevant portions of the Pension Code, we look for guidance to analogous
provisions of . . . ERISA, and the federal case law construing ERISA.”).
53 See, e.g., An Impulse to Help, PENSIONS & INVS. (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.pionline
.com/article/20121224/PRINT/312249998/an-impulse-to-help (comparing New York
Teachers’ Retirement System to ERISA standards).
54 See Barrington, 570 N.E.2d at 626 (noting the inapplicability of ERISA).
55 There are two basic types of pension plans: defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans. The existence of defined benefit plans has declined sharply in the
private sector, but remains the dominant form in the public sector. While the analysis
below may have implications for defined contribution plans, which have become more
prevalent in the public sector since the recent financial crisis, my default assumption will be
that, in discussing public pension plans, I am referring primarily to defined benefit plans.
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A. ERISA’s Duty of Loyalty and the Exclusive Purpose Rule
ERISA codifies the traditional fiduciary duties of trust law,
including the duties of loyalty and prudence.56 Under the traditional
duty of loyalty, trustees are required “to discharge their responsibili-
ties with exclusive concern for the welfare of their beneficiaries.”57
This duty is embodied in Sections 403 and 404 of ERISA.58 Section
403 states: “[A]ssets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any
employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing
benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries . . . .”59 Sec-
tion 404 of ERISA sets forth the “exclusive purpose” rule, which is
the touchstone for analysis of fiduciary questions like the one
presented here.60 It states that “a fiduciary shall discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing bene-
fits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reason-
able expenses of the plan.”61
Historically, the duty of loyalty required that a trustee “admin-
ister the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”62 The First,
Second, and Third Restatements of Trust make it clear that the pri-
mary purpose of the duty of loyalty is to prevent conflicts of interest
between trustees and beneficiaries.63 It was not created to prioritize
the interests of participants and beneficiaries in maximizing returns to
the fund over other participant and beneficiary interests in the fund.64
According to the Restatements, trustees should not profit at the
expense of beneficiaries,65 sell trust properties to themselves, even if
the sale is in good faith and the trustees pay fair consideration,66 sell
56 See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2012) (imposing duty of loyalty); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012) (imposing duty of prudence).
57 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Interpretive Bulletin 08-1 and Economically Targeted
Investing: A Missed Opportunity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 11, 12 (2009) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007)) (discussing a trustee’s duty of loyalty).
58 See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2012) (codifying ERISA § 403); see also id. § 1104(a)(1)
(codifying ERISA § 404).
59 Id. § 1103(c)(1) (codifying ERISA § 403(c)(1)).
60 See id. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (exclusive purpose rule).
61 Id.
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS
§ 170 (1935).
63 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt.; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 78 cmt. (2007); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt.
64 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt.; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 78 cmt.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt.
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. a; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS
§ 170 cmt. a.
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS
§ 170 cmt. b.
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trust property to a firm in which they have an interest,67 etc. In short,
the duty of loyalty has always been aimed at thwarting the frequent
and enormous temptation for trustees to exercise their powers in their
own interests, rather than in those of the trust’s beneficiaries.68 This
preoccupation is so central to the fiduciary duty of loyalty that even
transactions that can be shown to have caused no harm to benefi-
ciaries are barred, because of the slippery slope they might create for
fiduciaries.69
In part, the duty of loyalty was imported from trust law into
ERISA in response to widespread corruption and racketeering inside
labor unions like the Teamsters, which included the looting of union-
controlled employee benefit funds.70 The duty of loyalty was devel-
oped to require trustees to prioritize the interests of beneficiaries.71
Crucially, the duty of loyalty also bars trustees from elevating the
interests of third parties above beneficiaries.72 As I will argue below,
the ascendant view of fiduciary duty arguably violates this principle by
elevating the interests of outside investment managers above fund
participants and beneficiaries. Most investment managers are com-
pensated based on the performance of their investment portfolios rel-
ative to industry benchmarks (in addition to the total assets under
management).73 Consequently, they are incentivized to value fund
performance above all else. This may be the right compensation
scheme for such managers, but it is not necessarily in the best eco-
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. c; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS
§ 170 cmt. c.
68 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 108 (2011) (“[F]iduciaries [must] act for the
sole benefit of the entrustors. . . . [P]reventive rules act to dampen the fiduciaries’
temptations to misappropriate entrusted property or power, or to justify benefitting
themselves, and establish a continuous reminder that entrusted property or power do not
belong to the fiduciaries.”).
69 See id. at 108–09 (“[F]iduciaries are prohibited from buying entrusted property for
their own account . . . even if the purchase saves the entrustor a broker’s commission. . . .
Presumably, this transaction can be repeated to create a bad habit of considering one’s
own interests as well as the entrustors’ interest in relationship to the entrusted property.”).
70 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 38, at 1110 (describing the events leading to the
creation of ERISA).
71 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or
Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 932 (2005) (“The underlying purpose of the duty of
loyalty . . . is to advance the best interest of the beneficiaries.”).
72 See, e.g., Hastings v. PNC Bank, NA, 54 A.3d 714, 725–26 (Md. 2012) (citing Bd. of
Trs. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 738 (Md. 1989) (“[Under the duty of loyalty, a]
trustee also must refrain from using the advantages of the fiduciary relationship for the
benefit of a non-beneficiary third party.”)).
73 See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap
for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 285–86 (2007)
(noting that many fund managers are paid according to benchmarks as an incentive to earn
higher returns).
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nomic interests of fund members, at least when it comes to privatizing
investments.
The DOL has issued two Interpretive Bulletins relating to the
exclusive purpose rule that are relevant to this Article, the first under
President Bill Clinton and the second under President George W.
Bush. In June 1994, the DOL issued Interpretive Bulletin 94-1 (the
1994 Bulletin), offering its view of the exclusive benefit rule as applied
to economically targeted investments (ETIs). ETIs are generally
defined as “investments selected for the economic benefits they create
apart from their investment return to the employee benefit plan.”74
According to the 1994 Bulletin, employee benefit plans may invest in
ETIs if the expected rates of return and risk characteristics of the
ETIs are “comparable” to those of other available alternative invest-
ments.75 One observer stated that:
[The 1994 Bulletin] did reinforce a departure from an approach sug-
gested in earlier [DOL] letters to the effect that investment oppor-
tunities must be considered initially solely for their investment
merit, and only then for their collateral benefits. The [1994] Bulletin
implicitly allowed economic and collateral benefits to be considered
side-by-side, although the economic considerations must take
precedence.76
In October 2008, towards the end of President Bush’s second
term in office, DOL issued Interpretive Bulletin 08-1 (the 2008 Bul-
letin), which emphasized that fiduciary consideration of “non-eco-
nomic” factors should be rare.77 One could argue that the 2008
Bulletin was not a clarification of the 1994 Bulletin but in fact a nar-
rowing of the fiduciary rule. However, the 2008 Bulletin itself holds
74 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (2002); see also Michael B. Richman, DOL Clarifies Position
on Economically Targeted Investments, 2 J. TAX’N EMP. BENEFITS 233, 233 (1995) (“ETIs
are investments selected not only to generate an economic benefit for the investing plan,
but also to create collateral benefits to the general economy, such as developing
infrastructure or building low-income housing.”); Patrick S. Cross, Note, Economically
Targeted Investments—Can Public Pension Plans Do Good and Do Well?, 68 IND. L.J. 931,
934–35 (1993) (defining ETIs).
75 Richman, supra note 74, at 233.
76 Id. at 235; see also Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, High Performance Investing:
Harnessing the Power of Pension Funds to Promote Economic Growth and Workplace
Integrity, 11 LAB. LAW. 59, 59 (1995) (arguing that, in the 1994 Bulletin, the DOL took a
“strong position encouraging economically targeted investments (ETIs) and shareholder
activism by pension funds”).
77 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted Investments, 73
Fed. Reg. 61,734 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) (“[The bulletin]
clarifies, through explanation and examples, that fiduciary consideration of non-economic
factors should be rare and, when considered, should be documented in a manner that
demonstrates compliance with ERISA’s rigorous fiduciary standards.”).
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that its guidance “modifies and supersedes the guidance set forth in”
the 1994 Bulletin.78
Quoting the exclusive purpose rule, the 2008 Bulletin states that
“ERISA . . . establishes a clear rule that in the course of discharging
their duties, fiduciaries may never subordinate the economic interests
of the plan to unrelated objectives, and may not select investments on
the basis of any factor outside the economic interest of the plan except
in very limited circumstances . . . .”79 The 2008 Bulletin further states
that fiduciaries should examine, “the level of diversification, degree of
liquidity and the potential risk/return in comparison with available
alternative investments.”80
There are three fundamental problems with these views of
ERISA. Most generally, to the extent that the 2008 Bulletin correctly
interprets the exclusive purpose rule, saying that fiduciaries must
ignore participant and beneficiary economic interests—even interests
directly related to plan investments—and focus instead on the plan
alone, this rule is inconsistent with aspects of trust law, agency law,
and even corporate law that would permit such considerations. More
specifically, it illustrates a point I develop in Part II: Aspects of trust
law that have been incorporated into ERISA are a bad fit for
employee benefit plans, particularly public pension plans, because the
agency costs of trusts differ markedly from those of public pension
plans. Because these arguments take us beyond ERISA and trust law,
I reserve them for discussion in a subsequent Part. Secondly, the plain
text of the exclusive purpose rule does not necessarily exclude eco-
nomic interests of plan participants and beneficiaries outside the eco-
nomic interests of the plan; as I will demonstrate, it can be, ought to
be, and has been read more broadly. Indeed, there are multiple cases
suggesting that the duty of loyalty owed by fund trustees runs not to
the fund but directly to the funds’ participants and beneficiaries them-
selves, supporting the member-first view. Thirdly, even if one
embraces the fund-first view, the 2008 Bulletin omits a factor in the
investment analysis that is crucial to the financial health of the plan:
participant and employer contributions. In addition to diversification,
liquidity, and risk/return, fiduciaries should consider, when relevant,
contributions made to the plan by the employer and by current and
future participants, and the impact these contributions would have on
the plan’s bottom line.81 Because recent reforms to public pension
78 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2013).
79 Id. (emphasis added).
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., Steven Yaccino & Michael Cooper, Cries of Betrayal as Detroit Plans to Cut
Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2013, at A1 (“When [Detroit] shrank its work force [over
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funds nationwide have almost universally resulted in increased contri-
butions from fund participants, the employee-contribution aspect of
the analysis will only become more important over time.82 Considera-
tion of participant and employer contributions, and future liabilities,
necessarily requires fund fiduciaries to consider the impact of the
fund’s investments on participant employment, at least in this context.
Unfortunately, fund fiduciaries fail to consider these factors.83
B. The Exclusive Purpose Rule Should Not Unduly Limit
Consideration of the Broader Economic Interests of Plan
Participants and Beneficiaries in Plan Investments
According to the 2008 Bulletin, “ERISA’s plain text thus estab-
lishes a clear rule . . . .”84 First, it is important to emphasize what
“plain text” the 2008 Bulletin cites: Section 403’s noninurement rule,
and, more relevantly, Section 404’s exclusive purpose rule. I disagree
that the plain text of the exclusive purpose rule establishes such a
narrow reading, and quote it again here for ease of comparison: “[A]
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive
purpose of (i) providing benefits to participants and their benefi-
ciaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of the plan.”85 It is true
that the existence of the fiduciary’s duties arises “with respect to a
plan.”86 A trustee is not a roving agent-at-large for plan participants
and beneficiaries, responsible for their economic welfare in its
entirety, making sure that they purchase a home for a fair price or
the prior six decades], it left fewer current workers to contribute to pension funds that still
had to pay benefits that were earned by large numbers of older retirees who had served
Detroit when it was a bigger city.”).
82 See In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (amended
plan for the adjustment of city debts in Chapter 9 allowed to reduce pension obligations);
see also, e.g., Hazel Bradford, Pace of Pension Reform Ebbs After 49 States Change Laws,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 14, 2014, at 4, 4 (“The financial crisis and its aftermath
sparked some kind of pension reform in every state except Idaho.”); Victoria M.
Cosentino, The Illinois State Pension Crisis: Secure Retirement for Public Servants at Risk,
19 DCBA BRIEF 18 (2006) (noting that Illinois required increased state contributions to
the state pension fund); ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, COLA
CUTS IN STATE/LOCAL PENSIONS 4 (2014) (finding that of the nine states where court
decisions on the reduction in cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for public pensions have
been handed down, eight of the states’ reductions have been upheld).
83 See Braun & Selway, supra note 1 (discussing public pension fund investments in
private-equity-owned companies, like Aramark, whose activities lead to a loss of public
jobs).
84 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2013).
85 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006).
86 Id.
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balance their checkbooks.87 Because the fiduciary’s duties arise “with
respect to a plan” there must be a connection between these duties
and decisions related to the plan itself. But this is not the same as
suggesting, as the 2008 Bulletin does, that the fiduciary, “may not
select investments on the basis of any factor outside the economic
interest of the plan . . . .”88 What about selecting investments for the
plan solely in the economic interests of its participants and benefi-
ciaries? What about selecting investments that maximize the economic
interests of the participants and beneficiaries, even if they further the
economic interests of the plan less than other investments? Before
entertaining these questions, I address the strongest textual argument
for the 2008 Bulletin’s “fund-first” view of the exclusive purpose rule.
The strongest argument favoring the view contained in the 2008
Bulletin emerges from the requirement that a fiduciary discharge her
duties, “for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits . . . .”89 The
legal definition of “benefits” is debatable.90 Some observers have con-
cluded that “benefits” refers to “those cash benefits that a participant
or his family would receive in accordance with the specifications of the
[retirement] plan.”91 Others advocate a broader view of what consti-
tutes benefits, with references throughout the legislative history of
ERISA to “benefits” of any type, which includes, for example, health
benefits, and which is arguably broad enough to include almost any-
thing that works to the advantage of fund participants and benefi-
ciaries.92 Such a broad reading is plausible and would be more
conducive to my argument, but it is not necessary. I will begin my
87 This point is beyond doubt, as the final clause empowers trustees to defray
reasonable expenses of the plan, and not reasonable expenses of participants and
beneficiaries personally insofar as those expenses are unconnected to the plan itself. 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006).
88 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2013).
89 Id.
90 See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 504 (1981) (allowing worker’s
compensation benefits to count toward the benefit received by the pensioner even though
it was not directly provided by the pension fund and noting that ERISA leaves open the
question of what constitutes the content of the benefit).
91 James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of
Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340, 1370 (1980).
92 See, e.g., id. (arguing that ERISA’s legislative history could be read to define
“benefits” as benefits related to retirement, but not other socially desirable benefits);
Ronald B. Ravikoff & Myron P. Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the
Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 531–32 (1980) (arguing that ERISA’s legislative
history indicates that “benefits” could mean job security and improved working
conditions); S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 30 (1973), reprinted in 1 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 587, 616 (“[A fiduciary must]
act consistently with the principles of administering the trust for the exclusive purposes . . .
enumerated . . . .”). But see John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and
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analysis by utilizing the narrowest definition of “benefits”—that it
means “retirement benefits”—for purposes of assessing the exclusive
purpose rule.
A proponent of the 2008 Bulletin’s approach to fiduciary duty
might argue that because the fiduciary must invest for the purpose of
providing “those cash benefits that a participant or her family would
receive,” the fiduciary should consider only the economic interest of
the plan, since it is the plan that pays those benefits.93 To consider
economic interests like employment would presumably go beyond the
“exclusive purpose . . . of providing benefits” and would therefore
exceed the trustee’s authority under the rule.94
There are two straightforward responses to this argument. First,
the benefits provided to plan participants and beneficiaries are inextri-
cably linked to the participants’ employment by the state, county, or
municipal entity that is the plan sponsor. For virtually all public pen-
sion plans, the size of the retirement benefit is a direct function of the
plan member’s salary and length of service.95 Loss of employment
means reduced retirement benefits.96 Similarly, reductions in the
number of hours worked, or demotions from full-time to part-time
the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 103 (1980) (critiquing the Ravikoff & Curzan
reading of “benefits” as misleading).
93 Hutchinson, supra note 91, at 1370.
94 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1. Langbein and Posner treat consideration of the jobs impact of
fund investments as a form of socially responsible investing, albeit with a “wrinkle”: Such
investing, “may provide a pecuniary offset to the financial cost of departing from
conventional investment strategy.” Langbein & Posner, supra note 92, at 76. They define
“social investing” to mean “excluding the securities of certain otherwise attractive
companies from an investor’s portfolio because the companies are adjudged to be socially
irresponsible . . . .” Id. at 73. As I make clear throughout this paper, I base my argument
not on the idea that companies that privatize public employee jobs should be excluded
because they are socially irresponsible, but that investments in such companies by public
pension funds may not be in the economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries,
and that it is this economic interest the trustees should consider in making investments.
95 Telephone Interview with William B. Fornia, FSA, President, Pension Trustee
Advisers, Inc. (Aug. 30, 2013) (interview notes on file with the New York University Law
Review) [hereinafter Fornia Interview]. Fornia is a well-known retirement consultant and
actuary with more than thirty years of industry experience. For Fornia’s professional
biography, see About Pension Trustee Advisors: William B. (Flick) Fornia, PENSION TR.
ADVISORS, http://www.pensiontrusteeadvisors.com/about.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
See also Longley v. State Emps. Ret. Comm’n, 931 A.2d 890, 905 (Conn. 2007) (showing
that, under state law, the base salary used to calculate a public employee’s pension is based
off the employee’s three highest years of state service); 60A AM. JUR. 2d Pension and
Retirement Funds § 1142 (2014) (discussing generally the ways in which longevity of
employment and salary based on merit shape public pensions).
96 See Bandt v. Bd. of Ret. of the San Diego Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass’n, 136 Cal. App. 4th
140, 159 (Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he pension of a member who loses his job will be
dramatically affected by that job loss.”); see also MASS. BENEFIT GUIDE, supra note 9
(calculating public pension benefits based on salary and years of service); Alan L. Gustman
& Thomas L. Steinmeier, Pension Portability and Labor Mobility: Evidence from the





      12/19/2014   13:53:46
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\89-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 24 19-DEC-14 11:58
December 2014] THE USE AND ABUSE OF LABOR’S CAPITAL 2129
status (as in the case of Carol Sanders, discussed in the Introduction),
results in lower retirement benefits payments.97 Such losses are even
more tangible to participants than investment losses incurred by the
fund, because most public pension funds are defined benefit plans,
entitling beneficiaries to fixed retirement payments.98 In theory,
investment losses are not passed along to beneficiaries.99 (In practice,
investment losses harm participants and beneficiaries. For example,
losses from the recent financial crisis have resulted in reduced bene-
fits, higher contribution rates, and higher medical costs for public
employees.100) Because of the close connection between employment
and retirement benefits, trustees who consider the impact of plan
investments on the employment of the funds’ participants and benefi-
ciaries may be discharging their “duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclu-
sive purpose of (i) providing benefits . . . .”101 This is only the analysis
under the narrowest definition of “benefits.”102 If one were to expand
the definition of benefits to include nonretirement benefits like health
benefits, which are also directly linked to employment by the sponsor,
the argument becomes even more straightforward.
Survey of Income and Program Participation, 50 J. PUB. ECON. 299, 300 (1993) (stating that
defined benefit pensions calculate benefits from formulae using job tenure and/or wages).
97 MASS. BENEFIT GUIDE, supra note 9.
98 See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Aftermath of the Cash Balance Controversy: Applying
the Contribution-Based Test for Age Discrimination to Traditional Defined Benefit
Pensions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 1, 5 (2009) (“A defined benefit plan, as its name implies,
defines benefits, i.e., promises participants outputs in the form of retirement income.”); see
also Karen Eilers Lahey & T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pension Liability: Why Reform Is
Necessary to Save the Retirement of State Employees, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 307, 311 (2007) (noting that most private pension plans are defined contribution
plans); Travis Bayer, Note, Defined (Yet Uncertain) Benefit Pension Plans in America, 87
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 201, 205 (2012) (noting that most public employees have defined
benefit plans).
99 See Zelinsky, supra note 98, at 5 (“The employer sponsoring a defined benefit
pension guarantees these promised payments.”).
100 Bradford, supra note 82, at 4 (“The financial crisis and its aftermath sparked some
kind of pension reform in every state except Idaho . . . . [Cost cutting measures included]
some combination of increasing employee contributions, raising age and tenure
requirements, trimming salary calculation formulas used to set pension levels and shrinking
or stopping cost-of-living increases.”).
101 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006). Similarly, a California appeals court approved pension
trustees’ consideration of the impact of their decisions on participant jobs. “Even assuming
. . . the Board’s sole duty is to protect members’ interests as beneficiaries, the pension of a
member who loses his job will be dramatically affected by that job loss. Thus, a member’s
interest as an employee is clearly related to his interest as a pension beneficiary.” Bandt,
136 Cal. App. 4th at 159.
102 Even under this narrowest of definitions, trustees should still be able to consider the
economic harm of the job loss itself, and not just the economic harm of the lost or reduced
benefits resulting from the job loss, even if they assess the former loss secondarily, as I
discuss below regarding the meaning of the word “exclusive.”





      12/19/2014   13:53:46
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\89-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 25 19-DEC-14 11:58
2130 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:2106
A second response to the argument that narrow construction of
the term “benefits” requires trustees to prioritize return on invest-
ment for the fund stems from the meaning of the word “exclusive” in
the phrase, “exclusive purpose of providing benefits.” In several
instances, including in the 2008 Bulletin itself, DOL has interpreted
the term “exclusive” to mean “primary” rather than “sole.”103 For
example, in discussing the “investments of equal value rule,” the 2008
Bulletin allows selection of investments “on the basis of a factor other
than the economic interest of the plan,” as long as the fiduciaries are
deciding between “two or more investment alternatives . . . of equal
economic value to a plan.”104 I critique the “investments of equal
value rule” below in Part I.C because it subordinates the economic
interests of plan members to the economic interests of the plan, going
as far as allowing fiduciaries to select investments that harm members
so long as they are of equal value to the plan. Even the view contained
in the 2008 Bulletin tolerates an understanding of “exclusive” to mean
“primary” rather than “sole.” It concedes that interests beyond the
economic interests of the plan may be considered. The question then
becomes not whether fiduciaries may consider the employment
impact of investments, but at what stage in the investment analysis
they may consider it, and how much weight it ought to be given.
Read this way, the exclusive purpose rule appears to be more
accommodating of broader economic considerations like participant
employment than the 2008 Bulletin allows. This reading is buttressed
by the original purpose of the duty of loyalty: to prioritize the interests
of fund members over the interests of trustees, stemming from the
natural concern that fiduciaries will be tempted to exercise their enor-
mous power over the fund in their own interests, rather than in those
of the members. Thus, the “plain text” of the exclusive purpose rule
does not clearly support a fund-first view. While there is support for a
fund-first view in the case law, as I discuss below, there is competing
precedent supporting a member-first reading of the duty of loyalty as
well.105
103 See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2013) (permitting fiduciaries to choose between
investments of equal economic value to the plan).
104 Id.
105 In this Article, I advocate a member-first view based on member economic interests
in plan investments. There is a literature arguing that fiduciaries should be able to consider
interests that go beyond economic and financial interests. E.g., THE ASSET MGMT.
WORKING GRP. OF THE UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL,
SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT (2009), available at
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/fiduciaryII.pdf. I discuss this point below in
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Consider the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Varity
Corp. v. Howe.106 In Varity, the Court allowed individual claimants to
proceed with their claim for equitable relief under ERISA.107 The
plaintiffs sought to be transferred from their new pension plan back to
their original pension plan, arguing that the defendants had deceived
them into switching plans.108 The Court rejected defendants’ argu-
ment that such relief was unavailable under ERISA because of Sec-
tion 409, which authorizes damages for fiduciary breaches to be paid
to the plan only.109 That the Court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed as
individuals for breach of fiduciary duty makes it clear that such duties
run to the individuals, and not to the plan alone.110 In fairness, courts,
including the United States Supreme Court in Varity, have treated
fiduciary duties in the investment context somewhat differently than
in other contexts, though whether this treatment is correct, and
whether it is in fact driven by a debate over the remedies for fiduciary
breaches and not the substance of the fiduciary duties themselves, is a
separate question.111
Part III.A.1, in which I consider the prospects of a divestment or boycott strategy for
privatizing investments.
106 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510 (1996) (holding that ERISA section
502(a)(3) contained an individual right of action for beneficiaries seeking “appropriate
equitable relief”).
107 Id. at 515.
108 See id. at 492 (determining that reinstatement into the plan was an equitable action,
and thus allowed as “equitable relief”).
109 See id. at 510 (holding that section 409 limited the rights of action to the whole plan
only for actions seeking nonequitable damages).
110 Id. at 515.
111 See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 255–56 (2008)
(distinguishing from Russell by holding that an individual plaintiff may proceed under
ERISA section 409 for damages to his defined contribution plan, saying that “[w]hether a
fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all participants and beneficiaries, or only
to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it creates the kind of harms that
concerned the draftsmen of § 409”); Varity, 516 U.S. at 515 (analyzing the rights of action
available to an injured individual for fiduciary breaches); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147–48 (1985) (holding that extracontractual damages were
unavailable under section 409(a)).
As noted, the 2008 Bulletin espouses a fund-first view of fiduciary duty. Separate from
the question of what constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA and state pension
codes is the question of what remedies are available for such breaches. Here, comparisons
between ERISA and state pension codes become more problematic. For example, ERISA
section 502(a)(2) allows for civil actions to be brought for relief under section 409, entitled
“Liability for Breaches of Fiduciary Duty.” Section 409 provides remedies for the fund
alone, although individuals may bring a claim under sections 502(a)(2) and 409, and may
obtain relief, at least in the defined contribution context. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.,
529 F.3d 207, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs who have already cashed out of
their plan and are seeking damages as benefits owed directly to themselves individually
based on what the value of their plan would have been at the time of cash out without a
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At least one state court has held that pension trustees may take
participant jobs into account when making fiduciary decisions. In
Bandt v. Board of Retirement, San Diego County Employees Retire-
ment System, plaintiff fund participants sued the board of trustees of a
public pension fund for agreeing to an interim fund valuation that
would reduce the county employer’s contribution to the fund.112 The
county had agreed to increase retirement benefits for fund partici-
pants and beneficiaries by $1.1 billion, and sought to have its fund
contribution for half of that amount ($550 million) accounted for in a
postcontribution interim valuation.113 The board agreed to the interim
valuation, even though it would reduce the county’s contribution to
the fund from what it would have been in the absence of the interim
valuation (though the revised contribution would still be higher than
what it would have been had the county never agreed to the increased
benefits in the first place).114 The California Court of Appeals for the
Fourth District rejected the plaintiffs’ contention, among others, that
the board had improperly considered the county’s assertion that
failure to conduct the interim valuation would have forced it to lay off
1500 fund participants.115 Even though the interim valuation would
hurt the fund by reducing the employer’s contribution to it, the court
rejected the claim that the trustees had breached their fiduciary
duties.116 Its reasoning suggests that the trustees’ conduct was justified
breach of fiduciary duty still have standing to make a claim under section 502(a)(2) on
behalf of the plan).
The Supreme Court has been sharply criticized by scholars who have argued that its
interpretations of ERISA have created gaps between the statute’s substantive fiduciary
duties and the remedies available for breach of those duties. See, e.g., John H. Langbein,
What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell,
Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2004) (critiquing Supreme Court
opinions holding that “equitable relief” in section 502(a)(3)(B) excludes damages);
Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 827, 835–52 (2006) (offering numerous
examples of how erroneous judicial interpretation of ERISA has led to cases in which
there are no remedies under the statute for clear violations of the statute). I do not mean
to suggest that these scholars view interpretations of section 502(a)(2) as having created a
similar gap; I only underscore the difference between substantive ERISA fiduciary duties
and remedies. Regardless of how one reads ERISA’s remedies, they differ substantially
from those found in state pension codes, in contrast to substantive fiduciary duties, which
are quite similar. For example, just five states and the District of Columbia have an
equivalent of section 409. COLO. REV. STAT § 24-51-207 (2014); D.C. CODE § 1-742 (2001);
40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 1-114 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11:264.5 (Supp. 2009);
MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 21-206 (LexisNexis 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-
3-443 (2013).
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under both a member-first view and the modified fund-first view I
advocate below in Part I.E. It supports a member-first view because
the court concluded that the interim valuation “was in its members’
interests”: “[T]he pension of a member who loses his job will be dra-
matically affected by that job loss. Thus, a member’s interest as an
employee is clearly related to his interest as a pension beneficiary.”117
And it supports the modified fund-first view too: “[T]he Board was
informed by the Association’s actuary that job losses could also nega-
tively impact the financial condition of the retirement fund itself.”118
The holding in Bandt squarely supports the position taken in this
Article, and it does so while interpreting California’s duty of loyalty
and exclusive purpose rule, which is practically indistinguishable from
ERISA Section 404.119
Turning specifically to the breach of substantive fiduciary duties
in the investment context, I have found some evidence that the exclu-
sive purpose rule has been read by courts—in one case rejecting posi-
tions taken by DOL in legal briefs—to embrace (in effect if not in
word) the member-first view.120 I do not wish to overstate this argu-
ment, but a couple of cases have arguably crossed that line, or at least
have come tantalizingly close to doing so. The cases grapple with the
fiduciary implications of fund loans made to fund participants and
beneficiaries at below-market rates. Section 1108 of Title 29 of the
United States Code exempts loans to plan participants or beneficiaries
from ERISA’s restrictions against transactions between plans and par-
ties in interest, so long as the loans are “available to all such partici-
pants and beneficiaries on a reasonably equivalent basis, (B) are not
made available to highly compensated employees . . . in an amount
greater than the amount made available to other employees . . . , (D)
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 17(b) (“The members of the retirement board of a public
pension . . . shall discharge their duties with respect to the system solely in the interest of
. . . participants and their beneficiaries, [and the] board’s duty to its participants and their
beneficiaries shall take precedence over any other duty.”). The Bandt court’s ruling did not
rely upon the clause “minimizing employer contributions thereto” because the final
provision of section 17 prioritizes acting in the interests of participants and beneficiaries
over the interests of the employer. 136 Cal. App. 4th at 150.
120 See Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586, 587 (11th Cir. 1986) (permitting trustee to make
below-market-rate loans to plan participants); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Vill. of Barrington
Police Pension Fund v. Dep’t of Ins., 570 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that
below-market-rate loans were not current compensation and thus did not violate the
statute prohibiting compensation in addition to salary); Bandt, 136 Cal. App. 4th at 159
(rejecting appellants’ argument that pension trustees must consider the interests of the
fund only and approving the trustees’ consideration of the jobs impact of completing an
interim fund valuation that would reduce the employer’s contribution to the fund).
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bear a reasonable rate of interest, and (E) are adequately secured.”121
At least two courts have ruled that trustees did not breach their fidu-
ciary duties in loaning plan funds to participants and beneficiaries at
below-market rates. In Brock v. Walton, the trustees of the Operating
Engineers Local 675 Pension Fund created a program to make first
mortgage loans on residential property available to fund participants
carrying an interest at a rate 2 1/8 percentage points below the pre-
vailing rates in the community.122 DOL sued, alleging, inter alia, that
the trustees violated Section 404’s exclusive purpose rule by failing to
charge the market rate.123 The logic of DOL’s argument is identical to
the view expressed in the 2008 Bulletin. To loan money to the funds’
participants and beneficiaries at below-market rates is to favor the
interests of the funds’ participants and beneficiaries (at least the ones
who take out loans) over the funds themselves. In essence, accepting a
lower rate of return in this context confers economic benefits on at
least some fund participants and beneficiaries. This should be consis-
tent with the duty of loyalty and the exclusive purpose rule as long as
the net economic benefit of the transaction to participants and benefi-
ciaries is at least equal to an alternative investment with higher
returns and the benefit is subject to the fiduciary considerations of
impartiality, prudence, and diversification, which I discuss below in
Part I.D.1–2.
In its brief to the Eleventh Circuit on appeal, DOL argued that,
“[t]he trustees established and operated the discount mortgage loan to
provide collateral, non-retirement benefits in the form of subsidized
housing for Plan participants. The program, therefore, was not ‘for the
exclusive purpose . . . of providing [retirement] benefits,’ as required
by Section 404(a)(1)(A).”124 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argu-
ment and denied that the loan program violated the exclusive purpose
121 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) (2012). DOL has taken the position that nothing in this
section “suggest[s] that Congress intended such loans to be exempt from the general
fiduciary obligations set forth in section 404 of the statute.” Reply Brief for the Appellant,
Secretary of Labor at 23, Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-5641) (on
file with the New York University Law Review).
122 Brock, 794 F.2d at 587. I focus here on the circuit court’s opinion. See also Paul J.
Wessel, Comment, Job Creation for Union Members Through Pension Fund Investment, 35
BUFF. L. REV. 323, 351–52 (1986) (interpreting the lower court opinion in Brock to mean
that job-creating investments within the union are not per se violations of the ERISA duty
of loyalty).
123 Brock, 794 F.2d at 587–88.
124 Brief for the Appellant Secretary of Labor at 10, Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th
Cir. 1986) (No. 85-5641) (alteration in original). Note that here the DOL inserted the term
“retirement” in brackets in its brief, reflecting its long-standing effort to restrict the term
“benefits” to retirement benefits alone, even though the word retirement does not appear
in Section 404. Id.
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rule.125 Brock highlights the thorough process employed by the fund
trustees to evaluate the investment, including extensive consultation
with lawyers, accountants, actuaries, and mortgage bankers, examina-
tion of loan rates charged by major commercial financial institutions
in the area, the rates of nontraditional mortgage loans in the area,
such as owner-financed loans, and each borrower’s employment back-
ground.126 The trustees further required that loan participants pledge
their accrued pension benefits as collateral for the loan, and that bor-
rowers whose equity was less than twenty percent obtained mortgage
insurance.127
In finding no breach, the court stated that “[t]he trustees
examined loan rates charged by major commercial financial institu-
tions in the area and determined that if they applied those rates they
would have virtually no loan activity.”128 What this means is not
apparent.129 Admittedly, this somewhat cryptic statement in Brock
makes it difficult to definitively conclude that the action favors the
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries, rather than the nar-
rower interests of the plan. Proponents of a “fund-first” reading of
this case would argue that this means that the trustees made a “fund-
first” decision by concluding that the prevailing rates in the commu-
nity were too high, and that no one would take out a loan from the
fund if they charged such rates. Under this reading, the board con-
cluded that loaning out money at approximately eight percent would
be more profitable to the fund than loaning it out at or above ten
125 See Brock, 794 F.2d at 587 (holding that the provision of such program did not cause
the trustees to violate their fiduciary duties under ERISA). The Illinois Court of Appeals
reached a similar conclusion under similar facts in Board of Trustees of the Village of
Barrington Police Pension Fund v. Department of Insurance, 570 N.E.2d 622, 627 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (concluding that a similar participant mortgage program does not violate the
exclusive purpose rule, absent a finding of imprudence). In another noteworthy case, Foltz
v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 865 F.2d 364, 373–74 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the D.C. Circuit
flatly stated that, “Section 404 creates no exclusive duty of maximizing pecuniary
benefits . . . ERISA’s evident approval of E[mployee] S[tock] O[wnership] P[lan]s
precludes any claim that it forbids employee ownership as a legitimate plan objective.”
This statement undermines DOL’s fund-first view, at least to the extent that this view
reflects the understanding that trustees are required under the exclusive purpose rule to
maximize returns to the fund. However, Foltz is distinguishable from the circumstances of
most public pension funds because one stated objective of the plan at issue in Foltz was to
perpetuate employee ownership of the defendant company, U.S. News & World Report.
126 Brock, 794 F.2d at 588.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 In an effort to discern the court’s exact meaning, I requested the relevant trial court
and appellate briefs from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The Clerk of the
Court sent me the appellate briefs, but was unable to locate the district court materials for
this case.
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percent because there would be more loan activity. If this were cor-
rect, one wonders why the market rate was not eight percent. This
fund-first reading confers an extraordinary amount of power on
boards to substitute their own pricing assessments for those of the
market.130 It is analogous to a board of trustees denying it breached its
fiduciary duties by paying $36 for Microsoft stock trading at $30
because, in the board’s estimation, the stock was really worth $36.
The opinion is more intelligible only when one concedes that the
primary investment analysis must have contemplated that a primary
benefit of the loan program was that it would allow fund participants
and beneficiaries to borrow at below-market rates.131 Under this read,
the court’s statement—“that if they applied [market] rates they would
have virtually no loan activity”—means that plan participants and
beneficiaries would not benefit from, and would therefore not bother
participating in, the loan program if it were offered at market rates.132
Since they could obtain the same rates elsewhere, there would be no
loan activity for the fund. Such a reading is more plausible because it
does not require one to read the opinion as conferring upon boards
the enormous power to set their own prices when market rates are
available. Read this way, the opinion offers support for the member-
first view. Furthermore, it supports the view that “benefits” could
include things like the benefit of taking out a below-market-rate loan
from the fund, which goes well beyond the narrow definition of bene-
fits referenced above. Admittedly, an explicit analysis of the favorable
impact of the loan program on fund participants and beneficiaries as
measured against the sacrifice in the return on the investment would
help to clarify the board’s conclusion that the net tradeoff was in the
economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries overall.
However, even without overt analysis of this point, a contrary, fund-
first reading strains credulity. The fund-first view of the opinion would
require readers to believe that fund trustees spent months consulting
with experts to devise a loan program offering below-market rates to
plan members. Additionally, trustees must have viewed this benefit as
merely incidental to the investment’s purportedly attractive rate of
130 Greater deference to board assessments of price might be appropriate when market
rates are nonexistent or unavailable.
131 The Brock court also stated that “[t]here is little question that a rate could be so far
below the market rate that it could not be justified as being in the best interest of the plan
or within the realm of prudence . . . .” 794 F.2d at 588. The statement is, again, ambiguous
on the fund-first versus participant-and-beneficiary first view. “Best interest of the plan” is
clearly a fund-first statement, but to add “or within the realm of prudence” suggests
something other than “best interest of the plan.” Otherwise, the second clause is
superfluous.
132 Brock, 794 F.2d at 588.
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return, 2 1/8 percentage points below the market rate. A fund-first
proponent would be better off arguing that the court simply got it
wrong.
In discussing Brock, I do not argue that the weight of authority is
on the side of a member-first rather than a fund-first view. In
Donovan v. Mazzola, the court found that a loan made at below-
market rates violated the exclusive purpose rule, although the court
dwelled on the numerous deficiencies with the loan and the process by
which it was made, and the lack of adequate collateral obtained, in
sharp contrast to the loan made in Brock.133 In addition, at least one
district court has rejected the approach taken in Brock, albeit in more
extreme circumstances.134 Still, while other courts have emphasized
the fund-first view, they are distinguishable from the situations con-
templated here. In Withers, a non-ERISA case based on New York
state law, a federal district court rejected the claim that the trustees of
the Teachers’ Retirement System of New York City violated their
fiduciary duties by investing in low-rated, unmarketable New York
City bonds.135 The court noted that the trustees had not made the
investment to protect participant jobs, but to protect the fund, which
was threatened by the imminent bankruptcy of New York City in the
late 1970s.136 “The extension of aid to the City was simply a means the
only means [sic] in their assessment to the legitimate end of
preventing the exhaustion of the assets of the T[eachers’]
R[etirement] S[ystem] in the interest of all of the beneficiaries.”137
Interestingly, the court noted the sizable payments, made to the fund
by the city, as justification for the investment, which would help pre-
serve the city and thereby the city’s payments to the fund.138 The court
noted in passing that participant contributions to the fund constituted
between seven and nine percent of total fund income and twenty-nine
133 Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1233–34 (9th Cir. 1983). Interestingly, the
Mazzola court had the opportunity to reject the notion that jobs are an appropriate
consideration for pension trustees under ERISA, but shied away from doing so. “Finally,
appellants assert that the new investment manager is inappropriate because he or she will
favor stock market investments as opposed to those generating employment for union
members. Nothing in the record, however, suggests that a court-appointed investment
manager will make investments in a manner inconsistent with ERISA.” Id. at 1239. Note
that references throughout this opinion to the trustees’ duties to the “Pension Fund” are
references to a specific fund—in contrast to the “Convalescent Fund”—and not to the
pension fund versus its own participants. Id. at 1226.
134 See McLaughlin v. Rowley, 698 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that
below market rate loans violated duty of prudence for numerous reasons).
135 Withers v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of N.Y.C., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
136 Id. at 1257.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1255.
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and thirty-one percent of fund investment income—smaller than the
city’s contributions, but still substantial.139 It is odd that the court con-
cluded that the investment’s impact on participant employment was
an extraneous consideration, but that the investment’s impact on the
health of the city’s finances was not. Although not stated by the court,
perhaps the distinction is possible because of the relative size of the
city’s contributions, or because reduction in participant employment
reduces not only contributions, but also the fund’s liabilities. On this
point the court is also silent.
Even if one takes the position that the fund generally benefits
from layoffs, it is not clear that this is true when the sponsor faces
bankruptcy, as did New York when Withers was decided, and as cities
like Detroit, Michigan, Stockton, California, and others face today.140
In another frequently cited opinion, Blankenship v. Boyle, a federal
district court found that pension fund investments that benefitted a
union and not the fund itself violated fiduciary obligations.141 An
investment that benefitted a union and not fund participants and ben-
eficiaries would also violate the member-first view propounded here.
While it is possible for there to be significant overlap between a
union’s interests and the interests of fund members, the interests are
not the same, and it is the interests of the fund participants and bene-
ficiaries that must remain paramount in the trustees’ calculations.
Again, I discuss Brock (and Bandt) above not to assert that the weight
of existing authority favors the member-first view, but to support the
idea that member-first is a plausible reading of ERISA, and the duty
of loyalty more generally. And the weight of Withers and Blankenship
favoring a fund-first view should not be overstated either.
Blankenship and Withers are district court cases, and Blankenship is
not clearly on point. It is more accurate to describe existing case law
as not having squarely settled the issue.
Finally, while a comprehensive account of the origins of the fund-
first view is beyond the scope of this paper, I offer here some observa-
tions on its scholarly and professional treatment. Some scholars and
practitioners have shaped a fund-first view of the duty of loyalty in the
139 Id. at 1251 n.2.
140 See Nancy Kaffer, Stephen Henderson & Matt Helms, Detroit Files for Bankruptcy
Protection, USA TODAY, July 18, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
07/18/detroit-prepares-bankruptcy-filing-friday/2552819/ (reporting that Detroit filed for
bankruptcy protection in July 2013); Malia Wollan, Years of Unraveling, Then Bankruptcy
for a City, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A1 (describing Stockton, California’s demise and
eventual filing of bankruptcy protection).
141 Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1106 (D.D.C. 1971).
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context of the socially responsible investing debate.142 There is sub-
stantial academic debate about whether, and to what extent, socially
responsible investors sacrifice returns, with some advocates arguing
that such investing is more profitable in the long run, and others
arguing that social investing underperforms the market.143 Some influ-
ential scholarship on the duty of loyalty has focused on concerns that
fund fiduciaries will use fund assets to pursue their own social and
political goals at the expense of fund participants and beneficiaries.144
Viewed in this context, fund-first may appear to be more protective of
the economic interests of fund members. The member-first view dif-
fers from a socially responsible investment view towards privatizing
investment. I do not justify the member-first exercise of exit or voice
over privatizing investments based on broad social concerns, but on
the economic interests of fund members. Prior scholarship treats the
jobs impact of investments as a form of socially responsible invest-
ment, and it could be viewed that way if one considers that providing
stable employment and sustainable retirement funds for a middle and
working class population is a social good.145 I do not argue that sacri-
ficing returns is justified by the advancement of broad social goals,
though perhaps it is. I argue that sacrificing returns might be justified
if it were offset by economic gains to fund members from preserved or
newly created jobs and from contributions to the fund by both
employers and employees. Furthermore, consideration of employer
and employee contributions requires that considering the jobs impact
of investments may improve the financial soundness of the fund itself.
142 Briefly, socially responsible investing means investing in companies that pursue
laudable social goals (e.g., green energy) or divesting from companies that pursue social
harms (e.g., tobacco companies). See Langbein & Posner, supra note 92, at 73 (defining
socially responsible investing).
143 See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 24 (exemplifying one side of this debate); Meir Statman,
How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio?, 22 J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 353
(1987) (same).
144 See Langbein & Posner, supra note 92, at 74 (concluding that socially responsible
investing may not comply with the duty of loyalty because it permits another party to gain
at the beneficiaries’ expense); see also Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private
Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387, 390–92
(1980) (discussing duty of loyalty implications involved in social investing); Zanglein, supra
note 76, at 71–73 (discussing pension investments in affordable housing, school
construction, and job-creating investments).
145 See Langbein & Posner, supra note 92, at 76 (describing the jobs issue as a “wrinkle”
on the social investment theme). For reasons I describe in the text, I view the jobs impact
of investments as distinct from social investment because it maintains focus exclusively on
the direct economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries.
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One objection to the member-first view’s consideration of jobs by
fund trustees is that it violates the protective nature of pensions.146
This argument has also been raised by critics who view consideration
of jobs as a form of socially responsible investing.147 Broadly speaking,
the “protective policy” refers to two closely-related concepts: (1) the
goal of protecting the retirement of pensioners and (2) ERISA and
state pension code protections from taxation, underfunding, collapse,
alienation, or assignment of pensions.148 The “paternalistic” protective
policy is designed “to assure [that] American workers . . . look for-
ward with anticipation to a retirement with financial security and dig-
nity, and without fear that this period of life will be lacking in the
necessities to sustain them as human beings within our society.”149
Examples of the protective policy include the tax-favored treatment of
pensions, and the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA that prevent
creditors from seizing pensions and bar nonretired workers from
alienating their pensions to buy a sports car.150 Section 1056(d)(1) of
ERISA is an example of an anti-alienation provision, stating that each
plan “shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated.”151 Courts have discussed the protective policy
almost exclusively in the context of its anti-alienation or anti-assign-
146 See, e.g., Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments:
Unprincipled, Futile, and Illegal: Hearing Before the H.J. Econ. Comm., 104th Cong. 10
(1995) (statement of John H. Langbein, Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale
Law School), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Faculty/Langbein51895
.pdf (“By reducing the financial return to the pension fund, bargain-rate lending [to create
jobs] necessarily sacrifices future retirement income. For present workers it involves just
that trade-off of retirement-for-preretirement income that pension plans were created to
guard against.”). As discussed above, both Barrington and Brock permitted bargain-rate
lending under ERISA and Illinois’s state pension code, respectively. See Board of Trs. of
the Vill. of Barrington Police Fund v. Dep’t of Ins., 570 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(holding that the offer of below market loans from a pension did not violate a local city
statute limiting public employee compensation to that provided by city ordinance); Brock
v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that ERISA requirement that mortgage
loans provided from pension be “reasonable” is distinct from requiring that they match the
prevailing rate).
147 Langbein, supra note 146, at 10.
148 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845, 851 (1997) (referencing both the broad purpose of
ERISA in protecting retirement beneficiaries as well as the specific application of ERISA’s
anti-alienation provision as “a pension law protective policy of special intensity” among
other protections).
149 Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates of Pension Protection: Amending the Anti-
Alienation Provision of ERISA Section 206(d), 80 OR. L. REV. 379, 383–84 (2001) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 93-727, at 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4849) (describing
“paternalistic” aspects of ERISA).
150 Langbein, supra note 146, at 20.
151 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(1) (2012).
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ment implications, like the one just quoted.152 Importantly, the policy
is not absolute, and exceptions exist, like knowing and voluntary
waiver of benefits executed to reach a settlement.153
Some critics have argued that investments that sacrifice retire-
ment income for current income run afoul of the protective policy.154
The argument is essentially the same as the argument justifying fund-
first, as is my response to it. The idea is that the exchange of below-
market rates of return for jobs preservation—or, as in Brock, mort-
gage loans—necessarily sacrifices retirement income for current
income, violating the protective policy.155 While the protective policy
is merely a policy and not a particular statutory provision, it is a goal
that manifests in a variety of statutes and rules, and to which there are
exceptions. Because its purpose is to protect the retirement security of
fund participants and beneficiaries, it would make little sense to
implement the policy in a way that thwarts its own goal. It is unsur-
prising that pension policies should favor retirement income over cur-
rent income, but this should not lead to the conclusion that pension
policy should always favor the reduction of the pensioner’s overall
economic welfare simply to improve retirement income. For example,
in Rhoades v. Casey, the Fifth Circuit allowed an individual to alienate
his rights to a retirement fund in order to settle a lawsuit, even though
it reduced his retirement income in favor of another benefit, the set-
152 See Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 292–93
(2009) (citing Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, in discussion of whether waiver of ex-spouses’ rights to
a pension is a type of proscribed alienation or assignment); Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845, 851
(invoking the “special intensity” of the protective policy implied by anti-alienation
clauses); Estate of Kensinger v. URL Pharma, Inc., 674 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2012)
(holding that the special protective policy of Boggs does not give anti-alienation protection
to already distributed pension funds); Rhoades v. Casey, 196 F.3d 592, 598–99 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851) (holding that the “protective policy” of anti-alienation
clauses can allow some knowing settlements to waive retirement benefits); In re Block, 121
B.R. 810, 813 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that the “policy of protecting pension
benefits” removes pensions from the reach of bankruptcy creditors).
153 See, e.g., Rhoades, 196 F.3d at 598–99 (“In general, the anti-alienation provision will
be read broadly as a ‘protective policy of special intensity’ which reflects the policy that
retirement funds should remain inviolate until retirement.” (emphasis added) (quoting
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851)). However, the anti-alienation provision of ERISA is not absolute.
See id. at 598 (“Courts, including this one, have noted that there is an exception to
ERISA’s anti-alienation provision for a knowing and voluntary waiver of retirement
benefits that is executed to reach a settlement.” (citing Finz v. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78, 82
(2d Cir. 1992); Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1991)).
154 See Langbein, supra note 146, at 10 (“By reducing the financial return to the pension
fund, bargain-rate lending [to create jobs] necessarily sacrifices future retirement income.
For present workers it involves just that trade-off of retirement-for-preretirement income
that pension plans were created to guard against.”).
155 Id.
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tlement itself.156 Thus, even if a jobs-preserving investment or divest-
ment reduces retirement income, it is not clear that the protective
policy should thwart such an investment decision, at least not unless
the investment clearly reduces economic welfare, which a member-
first view would disallow.157
In cases like Brock and Bandt, the “protective policy” was not
viewed as a barrier to allowing below-market-rate investments. Courts
have simply not discussed the protective policy in this context. The
fact that courts have departed from the policy by allowing a party to
alienate his ERISA-protected retirement income for purposes of set-
tling litigation suggests that the protective policy is not fatal to the
member-first view. At a minimum, even a strong advocate for
applying the protective policy in this context should not oppose con-
sideration of the jobs impact of investments under a fund-first view, as
discussed in Part I.E. More importantly, as I develop further in Part
I.D–E, privatizing investment of public pension funds can undermine
both current and retirement income for fund participants and benefi-
ciaries. It is not necessarily a zero-sum game.
I address another critique of member-first—that it impartially
benefits current workers at the expense of retirees—in Part I.D–E.158
C. The Inadequacy of the “Investments of Equal Value Rule”
The 2008 Bulletin permits fund trustees to consider factors
outside the economic interest of the plan in “very limited circum-
stances.”159 Those limited circumstances are delineated by what I call
the “investments of equal value rule.” As DOL explains:
Situations may arise, however, in which two or more investment
alternatives are of equal economic value to a plan. . . . [U]nder these
limited circumstances, fiduciaries can choose between the invest-
ment alternatives on the basis of a factor other than the economic
156 Rhoades v. Casey, 196 F.3d 592, 598–99 (5th Cir. 1999).
157 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1011 (2001) (arguing that the basis for the evaluation of legal rules should rest entirely
on welfare economics with no weight given to notions of fairness).
158 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 146 (“[P]ensioners who are already retired and who
depend upon the pension fund for current retirement income would derive no benefit from
subsidizing employment for cur-rent [sic] workers . . . . [T]rust-investment law (and now
ERISA) make it flatly illegal to sacrifice the interests of plan beneficiaries in this way.”). In
Part I.D–E, I argue that current retirees may, in fact, benefit from subsidizing employment
for current workers, and that, in any case, member-first does not necessarily violate the
duty of impartiality. Langbein’s arguments here are directed to private pension funds and
to investments that create jobs, not to public plans, and not to investments that destroy or
undermine jobs, though the logic of these arguments may be extended to privatizing
investments by public plans.
159 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2008).
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interest of the plan. . . . [B]efore selecting an economically targeted
investment, fiduciaries must have first concluded that the alterna-
tive options are truly equal, taking into account a quantitative and
qualitative analysis of the economic impact on the plan. ERISA’s
fiduciary standards expressed in sections 403 and 404 do not permit
fiduciaries to select investments based on factors outside the eco-
nomic interests of the plan until they have concluded, based on eco-
nomic factors, that alternative investments are equal. . . .
[F]iduciaries who rely on factors outside the economic interests of
the plan in making investment choices and subsequently find their
decision challenged will rarely be able to demonstrate compliance
with ERISA absent a written record demonstrating that a contem-
poraneous economic analysis showed that the investment alterna-
tives were of equal value.160
Thus, if Middlesex/MassPRIT and Louisiana Teachers had first
identified another investment of equal economic value to the
Aramark investment, only then could they have considered factors
like the employment of Rick Thorne or Carol Sanders in their invest-
ment analysis. Under the 2008 Bulletin, the employment impact anal-
ysis—a substantial part of the analysis conducted in the interests of
participants and beneficiaries—plays no role until the risk/reward cal-
culation for the plan has been made. Consequently, this part of the
analysis is rarely reached, or comes too late, for purposes of protecting
the economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries like
Thorne and Sanders. This explains why many funds would not even
bother to assess the economic impact of their investments on the
employment of the funds’ participants and beneficiaries, as noted by
Phil Griffith of Louisiana Teachers in the Introduction.161 The risk/
reward characteristics would be more favorable in the school services
sector for companies that pay lower wages because of the lower wages
themselves.162 As such, it is unlikely that a fiduciary would identify a
competing investment of equal value that also had no impact on
employment. The investments of equal value rule thus obscures anal-
ysis of the actual, economic stakes of participants and beneficiaries in
favor of analysis of the economic interests of the plan alone.163
160 Id. (emphasis added).
161 Braun & Selway, supra note 1 (quoting Griffith).
162 The comparison need not be limited to two investments in the same economic sector.
163 The DOL’s position dates back to at least 1990, when Ian Lanoff, the Pension
Administrator of the DOL stated that while ERISA “does not exclude the provision of
incidental benefits to others, the protection of retirement income is, and should continue to
be, the overriding social objective governing the investment of plan assets.” Jayne
Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees While Encouraging Economically Targeted
Investments, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 48–49 (1996). Interestingly, the investments of
equal value rule was instituted by Lanoff to dislodge the presumption established by DOL
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The investments of equal value rule has even more problematic
implications when applied in the context of employment.164 It turns
the notion of a fiduciary on its head by allowing a public pension
trustee to select an investment because it harms the economic inter-
ests of plan participants and beneficiaries, so long as the investment is
of equal value (to the fund) to another investment that does not harm
participants and beneficiaries. In the absence of litigation, it is nearly
impossible for an outside observer to assess what motivated particular
investments by public pension fiduciaries, but there is ample reason to
believe that some public pension investments might be selected to
undermine participant employment. Consider an investment made
by the Florida Retirement System—which invests the retirement sav-
ings of Florida public employees, about half of whom are public
school teachers—in the Edison Schools Company, today called
EdisonLearning, Inc. (Edison).
Edison was founded in 1992.165 At that time, it was a private com-
pany that contracted to run public schools, claiming it could run the
schools more cheaply and for a profit by, among other things, paying
teachers less.166 The company attracted favorable recognition from
those sympathetic to the school choice movement and for-profit edu-
during the presidential administration of Gerald Ford that an investment with a positive
union jobs impact was presumptively a form of socially responsible investing and a breach
of fiduciary duty. Telephone Interview with Ian D. Lanoff, Principal, The Groom Law
Group (Mar. 11, 2014). Lanoff represents five of the top ten and eight of the top twenty
largest public and private pension funds in the United States, and served as head of the
ERISA Program of the U.S. Department of Labor under the presidential administrations
of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Ian D. Lanoff, GROOM L. GROUP, http://www
.groom.com/attorneys-Ian-Lanoff.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). Thus, while the
investments of equal value rule may be an improvement on what preceded it, it still falls
short of maximizing the economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries, as
described above.
164 The investments of equal value rule may still be the right rule to follow in the context
of socially responsible investing. Ultimately, the question turns on the economic value of
the non-plan benefit to the plan participant or beneficiary. In the absence of a tangible,
measurable economic benefit like preservation or creation of jobs, it may well be that the
most prudent course is to follow the investments of equal value rule.
165 Marc Caputo, Edison Schools Accepts Buyout, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 13, 2003, at 1,
available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/edison-schools-accepts-buyout.
166 See David Moberg, How Edison Survived, NATION, Mar. 15, 2004, at 22 (“Edison’s
strategy often pushes out experienced teachers; relies heavily on lower-cost, newer
teachers whom Edison trains; and increases teacher turn-over—raising costs and
undercutting teaching.”); see also Marianne D. Hurst, Fla. Teachers Riled by Edison Deal,
23 EDUC. WK. 14, 14 (2003), available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2003/10/08/
06edison.h23.html (“Although Edison maintains it is not anti-union and does not seek to
eliminate jobs . . . its critics point to the company’s experience in the 200,000-student
Philadelphia school district, where Edison laid off classroom assistants, hallway monitors,
and school secretaries when it took control of 20 schools last year.”).
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cation, including elected officials.167 It also encountered frequent
opposition from public school teachers and teachers unions, who chal-
lenged its claims about improving test scores and asserted that its busi-
ness model relied on pushing out experienced teachers in favor of
newer, lower-cost teachers while shifting other costs to the public
sector.168 The company spent four years listed on NASDAQ
(1999–2003),169 during which time it reported a profit in just one
quarter and its stock price fell from a high of $36.75 to a low of 15
cents.170
In 2002, around the same time that Edison was flailing, Jeb Bush
was seeking reelection as the governor of Florida on a platform that
included privatization of public schools, promotion of school
vouchers, and criticism of teachers unions.171 His reelection was
strongly opposed by the Florida Education Association, Florida’s
public school teachers union.172 Upon reelection, Bush (and two of his
cabinet members) resumed their positions as trustees on the Florida
State Board of Administration, which directs investment for the
Florida Retirement System.173 In July 2003, shortly after Bush
resumed office, Liberty Partners, investing the Florida Retirement
System’s pension assets, announced its anticipated purchase of Edison
Schools for $182 million.174 The deal was completed in November
2003.175 Thus, like the investments of Middlesex/MassPRIT and Loui-
siana Teachers in Aramark, the Florida State Board of Administration
utilized teacher retirement funds to invest in a business that under-
mined teacher employment.
In the absence of a factual record established in litigation, it is
impossible to know exactly what motivated this investment. Bush
167 See Moberg, supra note 166, at 22 (noting that Edison “attracted both enthusiastic
investors and support from politicians”).
168 See id. (“Critics say Edison also cuts support staff (at times increasing discipline
problems), avoids handicapped students and pushes out problem students.”).
169 See Helen Huntley, Legislators, Teachers Balk at Deal for Edison Schools, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Sept. 26, 2003, 1:49 AM), http://www.sptimes.com/2003/09/26/
Business/Legislators__teachers.shtml (discussing the financial downfall of Edison schools).
170 Moberg, supra note 166, at 22.
171 See Moberg, supra note 166, at 22–23 (calling Jeb Bush an “ardent promoter of
privatization and school vouchers” and noting his reelection in 2002).
172 Id. at 22.
173 John Ellis (Jeb) Bush (1953-), FLA. MEMORY, http://www.floridamemory.com/
collections/governors/bush.php (Nov. 17, 2014). Under Florida law, the governor and two
of his cabinet members comprise the State Board of Administration. FLA. STAT. § 121.0312
(2013).
174 See Moberg, supra note 166, at 23 (noting Liberty Partners’ winning bid in 2002 and
formal signing of the contract in July 2003).
175 See id. (discussing nominal investments made by Liberty Partners in November 2003
after criticism of the deal).
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stated publicly that, “he knew nothing of the deal before it was
announced,” which might have been a damaging admission in a world
in which fiduciary duty functioned normally.176 The teachers unions
alleged that the investment was driven by Bush’s school choice politics
and there were reports of numerous political and financial contacts
between Edison Schools, the bankers involved in the deal, and the
Bush administration.177 Doug Wiles, the leader of the Florida House
of Representatives at the time, stated that he had “deep concerns
about investing our state employees’ retirement funds in a company
that seeks to eliminate public jobs.”178 Under DOL’s investments of
equal value rule, Bush and the State Board of Administration could
have directed the Florida Retirement System to purchase Edison
Schools because it undermined participant employment and economic
interests, so long as the SBA could show that the risk/return, liquidity,
and diversification properties for the Florida retirement fund itself
alone were equal to other potential investments. Whether the Edison
investment might have been chosen for this reason is difficult to say,
but the example points to the possibility that it could have been
chosen for this reason, illustrating the problem.
Consider how the investment analysis changes under the
member-first view rather than the investments of equal value rule. In
addition to assessing risk/return, liquidity, and diversification, trustees
would have to assess the employment impact of the investment, its
potential for layoffs (and future hires), and the effect those layoffs
would have on plan participants and beneficiaries. More generally,
trustees would need to have a sense of how the investment impacts
current and future contributions to the fund by employees and the
employer, assuming the investment might contribute to layoffs or
reduced working hours for current fund participants.179 It is possible
that the Florida Retirement System’s investment in Edison might still
have qualified under this analysis, but it could only have done so if it
would outperform other investments after accounting for its projected
negative impact on teacher employment.180 Note that the member-
first view of fiduciary duty effectively reverses DOL’s investments of
equal value rule. Under the latter rule, trustees could select the
176 Caputo, supra note 165, at 2.
177 Id.
178 Kris Hundley, State Pays $180 Million in Fees, Gets Little from Long-Term
Investment, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 17, 2010 8:21 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/
business/state-pays-180-million-in-fees-gets-little-from-long-term-investment/1128708.
179 I analyze the question of whether investments can actually impact these employment
decisions in Part III.A.1.b below, in which I discuss the exit option.
180 For a discussion of how this impact might be assessed, see infra Part III.A.1.b. And
the duty of impartiality analysis still applies, as discussed below in Part I.D.
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Edison investment or an alternative investment of equal diversifica-
tion, liquidity, and return properties; therefore, it could select the
Edison investment precisely because it undermines public employee
jobs. But under the member-first view, when faced with two invest-
ments of equal value to the fund, trustees would have to select the
investment that does not harm public employee jobs, because any neg-
ative employment impact would tip the balance away from the jobs-
harming investment. The negative employment impact of such an
investment, assuming there was one, could have forced the Florida
Retirement System to select another investment.
This illustrates the flaws of DOL’s fund-first view and the inade-
quacy of the investments of equal value rule. The fund-first view
utilizes the duty of loyalty and the exclusive purpose rule—which
were designed to elevate the interests of fund participants and benefi-
ciaries over the interests of trustees or third parties—to undermine
the economic interests of members under the guise of advancing those
same interests in the fund alone.
D. Under a Member-First View, Trustee Discretion Is Still
Constrained by the Duties of Impartiality,
Prudence, and Diversification
I have focused on the duty of loyalty and the exclusive purpose
rule because it is DOL’s interpretation of them that most directly
forecloses consideration of the employment impact that I advocate in
this Article. However, public pension trustees are governed by a
matrix of fiduciary duties that overlap with the duty of loyalty—
including the duties of prudence, impartiality, and diversification—
that have implications for my member-first proposal. In this Subpart, I
argue that these duties constrain the agency cost concerns of my pro-
posal and appropriately limit the ways in which the employment
impact of fund investments may be taken into consideration.
1. The Duty of Impartiality
A member-first view of fiduciary duty might raise concerns about
the duty of impartiality, particularly as it manifests in potential con-
flicts between younger workers and older workers or retirees.181 It
181 See FRANKEL, supra note 68, at 177–78 (discussing fiduciaries who serve entrustors
with conflicting interests); see also White v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 268 P.3d 600, 609 (Or.
2011) (citing the duty of impartiality in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79(1)(a)
(2005)); Withers v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of N.Y.C., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing
Redfield v. Critchley, 252 A.D. 568 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937)) (“New York law imposes an
obligation on trustees to accord impartial treatment to beneficiaries.”). The duty of
impartiality is established in trust law. The Restatements of Trusts, discussed below, clearly
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might also raise concerns about conflicts between workers within the
same retirement fund who perform different jobs, such as firefighters
and teachers. The duty of impartiality requires trustees “to take
impartial account of the interests of all beneficiaries.”182 Under the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a trustee “must act impartially and with
due regard for the diverse beneficial interests created by the terms of
the trust . . . .”183 Trustees must not let personal favoritism affect their
decision-making, and must balance the various interests of benefi-
ciaries in carrying out their duties.184 A trustee should balance these
interests by looking to “the terms, purposes, and circumstances of the
trust.”185 However, this does not require equal balancing of diverse
beneficiary interests.186 A final comment from the Third Restatement
is worth noting: “The duty of impartiality is an extension of the duty
of loyalty to beneficiaries but involves, in typical trust situations,
unavoidably and thus permissibly conflicting duties to various benefi-
ciaries with their competing economic interests.”187 The comment
describes the duty of impartiality as an extension of the duty of loyalty
to fund beneficiaries themselves, illustrating that at least some duties
run past the trust or the fund itself as in the member-first view. More-
over, the inevitability of competing economic interests among fund
participants and beneficiaries reinforces the notion that a trustee need
not attempt the impossible—namely, to act equally in the interests of
all participants and beneficiaries at all times.188
contain a duty of impartiality. The weight of authority suggests that ERISA also contains a
duty of impartiality, though the issue is not completely settled. ERISA enumerates several
specific fiduciary duties without mentioning the duty of impartiality, and many state
pension codes likely remain silent on the topic as well. There might be good reason why
the duty of impartiality does not belong in ERISA and state pension codes. Since
employee benefit plans must cater to diverse constituencies—for example, firefighters,
police officers, and teachers all participating in the same retirement fund—a robust duty of
impartiality might paralyze fiduciary decision-making, as it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to make decisions that are truly impartial across such a large and diverse
constituency. Because the weight of authority suggests that the duty of impartiality applies
to ERISA and state pension codes, I analyze it here.
182 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514 (1996); see also Summers v. State St. Bank &
Trust Co., 104 F.3d 105, 108 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Picking and choosing among beneficiaries
[would be] in violation of the traditional duty imposed by trust law of impartiality among
beneficiaries.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959) (“When there are two
or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them.”).
183 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79(1)(a) (2007).
184 Id. § 79 cmt. b–c.
185 Id. § 79 cmt. b (citation omitted).
186 Id. § 79 cmt. c.
187 Id.
188 “Trustees could not treat every beneficiary equally. . . . ‘[I]t would be overly
simplistic, and therefore misleading, to equate impartiality with some concept of “equality”
of treatment or concern—that is, to assume that the interests of all beneficiaries . . . are
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One impartiality concern raised by a member-first view relates to
potential conflicts between younger workers, older workers, and
retired workers, although these conflicts are not always as sharp as
they are depicted to be.189 One potential conflict lies at the heart of
this Article: the interests of fund participants in their jobs. As Fischel
and Langbein observed twenty-five years ago, younger workers expect
more of their future income from their jobs than from their retirement
accounts, whereas the reverse is true for older workers, and, of course,
retired beneficiaries depend entirely on their pensions.190 Thus, a
policy that incorporates consideration of the impact of fund invest-
ments on participant jobs runs the risk of favoring younger workers at
the expense of older and retired workers, in violation of the duty of
impartiality. This is a real risk, and it is one that should be weighed
carefully under a member-first view. But it does not justify a blanket
rule prohibiting consideration of the resulting impact on jobs when
making fund investments.
In many instances the age conflict may be nonexistent, or at least
not a zero-sum game between older/retired and younger workers
because the former may have a direct economic interest in the latter
maintaining their jobs and contributing to the retirement fund. As I
discuss in Part I.E., retirees and older workers may also have an eco-
nomic interest in younger workers maintaining their jobs, contributing
to the retirement fund, and triggering employer contributions to the
fund. The interests of current workers in their own jobs is clearly
greater than retirees’ interest in those jobs, but the retiree interest is
not zero, and may even be substantially above zero. It is therefore
possible that the fund-first view harms retirees—and not just current
entitled to the same weight . . . .’” Awakuni v. Awana, 165 P.3d 1027, 1037 (Haw. 2007)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 79 cmt. b (2007)); Salmon v. Old Nat. Bank,
No. 4:08–CV–00116–JHM, 2012 WL 4213643, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2012)
(“Importantly, however, impartiality does not mean equality.”).
189 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 38, at 1120–21 (discussing the various divergent
interests of younger and older workers); see also Larry W. Beeferman, Paradigm Lost:
Employment-Based Defined Benefit Plans and the Current Understanding of Fiduciary
Duty, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
100 (James P. Hawley et al. eds., 2014) (arguing that the current understanding of fiduciary
duty is a poor fit for defined benefit plans).
190 See Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 333 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Firestone
standard applies to a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report,
Inc., 865 F.2d 364, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that retirees rely heavily on a fiduciary’s
duty to act solely with respect to plan participants’ and beneficiaries’ interests); Fischel &
Langbein, supra note 38, at 1120 (comparing retirees’ singular interest in retiree benefits
with the predominance of the “income stream from employment” on current employees’
finances). But see Futral v. Chastant, 564 F. App’x 117, 118 n.1 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that
the Firestone standard only applies to denial of benefits claims and not to suits for breaches
of fiduciary duty).
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workers—by ignoring the investment impact of fund investments on
current workers, and that retirees, too, would be better off under a
member-first view, even if they benefitted less than current workers.
Only the member-first view allows for the calculation of the actual
economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries to be done
accurately, since it is the only view that completely considers their
economic interest in fund investments. Thus, it would be ironic to
exploit the duty of impartiality to undermine a member-first view
when the purported beneficiaries of the duty of impartiality—in this
context, retirees—might be better off under it.
There is no reason to believe that a member-first view increases
the risks of impartial decision-making by trustees across the board.
Instead, it merely invites fund trustees to consider the complete set of
economic interests of participants and beneficiaries in fund invest-
ments. To the extent it manifests sharply, it appears to lead to
“unavoidably and thus permissibly conflicting duties to various benefi-
ciaries with their competing economic interests.”191 The una-
voidability of the age conflict suggests that trustees should manage it
under a member-first view the same way they manage it now: in good
faith, and with due regard to the various interests at hand, but without
being paralyzed by it. Consider a fund’s decision to make a long-term
investment that it believes will earn a market-beating rate of return
ten years from now. This is the kind of decision trustees face today
under the fund-first view. Older retirees may never see the benefits of
this investment. Decades may pass before younger workers reap its
benefits, if at all. But the same types of conflicts will manifest with
another investment choice, perhaps benefiting a different subset of
plan members. Trustees could hardly be found liable for breaches of
the duty of impartiality when age conflicts such as this one are inevi-
table, which explains why courts review such decisions under the
highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.192 In the rare case
in which courts have found a violation of the duty of impartiality, they
191 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. c (2007).
192 See, e.g., Mahoney v. Bd. of Trs., 973 F.2d 968, 971–72 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing 3A
AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 232 (4th ed. 1987))
(acknowledging the discretion trustees have in fulfilling their duty of impartiality, and
consequently applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to the trustees’
decision to increase benefits for beneficiaries who are still working); Williams v. WCI Steel
Co., 37 F. App’x 723, 730 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendant trustees because the trustees had “provided detailed reasons for
the unequal allocation of benefits,” satisfying arbitrary and capricious review). But see
Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 567 (3d Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review to the ESOP fiduciaries’ investments in the employer
because there was no evidence on the record that the fiduciaries actually interpreted the
terms of the ESOP plan or used their judgment).
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have done so when the conflict was not inevitable and where one set
of beneficiaries inexplicably bore the harm of an investment
decision.193
Another potential conflict within public pension funds that impli-
cates the duty of impartiality is between participants who work in dif-
ferent government sectors. For example, a general employees’
retirement fund might include teachers, firefighters, police officers,
clerical workers, sanitation workers, prosecutors and judges, etc. This
can complicate the impartiality analysis under a member-first view
because a firefighter’s job would not be at risk in an investment in
Edison Schools; similarly, a firefighter might be harmed by negotia-
tions to reduce the negative jobs impact on teachers of an Edison
Schools investment at some reduced rate of return to the fund. On the
other hand, a firefighter could benefit from an investment that led to
more hiring of teachers and therefore more contributors to the fund.
Also, while firefighters might be harmed by sacrificing returns to
reduce the negative impact on teacher jobs of a particular investment,
they might benefit overall from a member-first view, to the extent that
it would allow their own jobs to be considered when other investments
are proposed.
This impartiality conflict is substantially reduced in public pen-
sion funds that are organized by employment sector.194 Many funds
organize as teachers’ retirement systems or police or fire retirement
systems in which intrafund conflicts by job sector may be trivial or
nonexistent.195 A teachers’ retirement system would face fewer impar-
193 See Jackson v. Truck Drivers’ Union Local 42 Health & Welfare Fund, 933 F. Supp.
1124, 1144–45 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding violation of the duty of impartiality when trustees
of a health and welfare union fund granted participants coverage of prospective health and
welfare benefits but denied coverage of existing claims, as the trustees could not place the
“primary burden of a funding shortfall on a small number of sick beneficiaries”). But see
Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 104 F.3d 105, 108 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding, in a
unique factual situation involving a dummy sale of stock to an ESOP, that wages and fringe
benefits were not plan assets and that consideration of them by outside fund fiduciary in
pricing ESOP stock would have violated the duty of impartiality by favoring current
workers over retirees).
194 More uniform funds have less conflict and are more efficient. Paul M. Secunda,
Litigating for the Future of Public Pensions in the United States (Marquette Law Sch. Legal
Stud. Paper No. 14-19, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.crm?abstract_
id=2443147 (concluding that public pension plans are best served through uniform
regulation); Todd Richmond, Exemptions for Police, Fire Fighters in Walker Budget Bill
Sparks Questions of Political Payback, OSHKOSH NORTHWESTERN (Feb. 14, 2011), http://
www.thenorthwestern.com/viewart/20110214/OSH0101/110214045/Exemptions-police-fire-
fighters-Walker-budget-bill-sparks-questions-political-payback (quoting Paul Secunda
discussing the costs and difficulties of treating different public pensions differently within a
state).
195 Many funds organize as police or fire pensions. See, e.g., Police and Firemen’s
Retirement System (PFRS) , DIV. PENSIONS & BENEFITS (May 8, 2013),
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tiality conflicts over an Edison Schools investment decision than
would a general retirement system that includes teachers. A police
and fire retirement system would be unlikely to face a jobs-related
issue at all when deciding to invest in a company like Edison, not
because of impartiality concerns, but because Edison does not com-
pete with its participants for jobs. In such cases, the jobs impact on
teachers would be irrelevant to the analysis. The member-first view is
not about solidarity between public employees to avoid investing in
businesses that may harm other public employees. It is about fiducia-
ries vindicating the actual economic interests of their funds’ partici-
pants and beneficiaries.
Thus, the duty of impartiality requires trustees to assess the
potentially disparate impact on fund participants and beneficiaries of
a jobs-sensitive investment decision, but does not itself conflict with a
member-first view of fiduciary duty.
2. Duties of Prudence and Diversification
ERISA sets forth a modified version of the prudent person stan-
dard of care, stating that fiduciaries should discharge their duties
“with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of
a like character and with like aims.”196 Plan fiduciaries also have a
duty to diversify the plan’s investments “so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to
do so.”197 Departing from the old prudent person rule, DOL inter-
preted ERISA’s prudent person rule to require that each investment
be considered in the context of the whole investment portfolio, to
accommodate the diversification requirement and the rise of Modern
Portfolio Theory (MPT).198 This interpretation is consistent with the
rise of the prudent investor rule, which has replaced the prudent
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/pfrs1.shtml (all New Jersey police and fire are
required to join an exclusive state public pension system rather than a local pension
system).
196 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012).
197 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C); see also Peabody v. Davis, 636 F.3d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 2011)
(noting that under ERISA Eligible Individual Account Plans (EIAPs) are exempt from
diversification requirements with respect to employer securities); Quan v. Computer Scis.
Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 878 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 401(k)s are EIAP accounts and
exempt from diversification requirements); Moench, 62 F.3d at 568 (holding that
fiduciaries of ESOPs are exempt from duty to diversify).
198 See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, The Prudent Investor Rule: A
Theoretical and Empirical Reassessment 1, 2–8 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(b)(1)(i) (2013)), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/wp/
wp-content/uploads/centers/clbe/schazenback-the-prudent-investor-rule.pdf (describing
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person rule in most jurisdictions, and focuses on the overall perfor-
mance of the portfolio rather than individual investments.199 Still,
ERISA’s legislative history indicates how the statute retained certain
elements of the prudent person rule:
These salient principles place a twofold duty on every fiduciary: to
act in his relationship to the plan’s fund as a prudent man in a sim-
ilar situation and under like conditions would act, and to act consi-
stently with the principles of administering the trust for the
exclusive purposes previously enumerated, and in accordance with
the documents and instruments covering the fund unless they are
inconsistent with the fiduciary principles of the section.200
Of most relevance to this Article is how MPT and the prudent
investor standard require fiduciaries to analyze investments. As with
the prudent investor rule, the investment inquiry focuses not on any
particular asset’s individual risk—as was the case under the prudent
person rule—but rather on how the asset’s risk contributes to the
portfolio’s risk.201 A critic of the member-first view would argue that
this view invites fund trustees to decrease returns or increase the risk
of the overall investment portfolio either by screening out investments
that harm participants’ jobs, by permitting fund trustees to seek
accommodations from investees to reduce the adverse jobs impact of
the investment, or by permitting investments selected for a combina-
tion of their return on investment (ROI) and their potentially positive
impact on participant jobs, rather than ROI alone.202 The
pro–member-first view argument is that such investments could
advance the overall economic interests of fund participants and bene-
the roots of the prudent investor rule under the Restatement of Trusts, the Uniform
Prudent Investor Act, and federal law).
199 Id. at 9.
200 H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 13 (1974); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (fiduciaries
are to follow the specific guidelines of a trust so long as such guidelines are consistent with
the prudent person standard of care).
201 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 198, at 9 (“[MPT emphasizes] that an
investment cannot be analyzed in isolation, but must be placed in the context of the
portfolio. We do not care about an asset’s individual risk, but rather how that asset’s risk
contributes to the portfolio’s risk.”).
202 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959) states: “[T]he trustee is under
a duty to the beneficiar[ies] . . . to make such investments, and only such investments, as a
prudent man would make of his own property having in view the preservation of the estate
and the amount and regularity of the income to be derived . . . .” A fund-first proponent
might argue that “preservation of the estate” means maximizing return on investment, but
for reasons similar to those I state in Part I.B, the amount and regularity of the income to
be derived are both directly affected by jobs, and therefore this traditional formulation of a
trustee’s duties does not decisively favor the fund-first approach. Regardless, section 227 of
the Restatement (Second) has been superseded by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90
(2007), which jettisons this particular formulation of the duty.
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ficiaries, not that they advance the interests of their portfolios alone.
Under a member-first view, it is possible that funds would fare more
poorly than they would under a fund-first view, although it is also pos-
sible that they would not; the question is whether the fund-member
tradeoff is justified if the jobs gains to participants outweigh the
investment costs, or if investment losses are offset by the employee
and employer contributions made in connection with participant jobs.
To the extent that there is a clash between fund and member interests,
the legal questions become: To what extent does a member-first view
clash with the duties of prudence and diversification? Can it be
accommodated under the prudent investor rule, or for that matter,
under the traditional prudent person rule?
The short answer is that there is little legal clash here. The orig-
inal prudent person standard required that a trustee exercise the care,
skill, and caution that “a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in
dealing with his own property.”203 A trustee had to make “an investi-
gation as to the safety of the investment and the probable income to
be derived therefrom.”204 The standard of skill to be applied was “the
skill of a man of ordinary intelligence,” and the standard of caution
was the “caution of a prudent man . . . with a view to the safety of the
principal and to the securing of an income reasonable in amount and
payable with regularity.”205 Logically, under the prudent person stan-
dard, a person of ordinary prudence would not invest her own prop-
erty without at least considering its potential impact on her other
income, if she had reason to believe it could have such an impact. The
owner of a McDonald’s franchise would not automatically invest her
assets to open a Burger King across the street without considering the
Burger King’s impact on her McDonald’s, even if the Burger King
investment alone would offer a good return. She would consider the
potentially negative impact of the investment on her McDonald’s, the
probability that the Burger King would open anyway, and whether
there are alternative investments that would have less of an impact on
her McDonald’s, perhaps a Taco Bell. Under the prudent person rule,
she would not be permitted to make investments as a trustee that she
would not make for herself.
Over time, several problems emerged under the old prudent
person standard. For example, it discouraged investments in stocks in
favor of purportedly conservative investments like corporate and
municipal bonds, thereby exposing portfolios to substantial inflation
203 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174.
204 Id. § 227 cmt. b.
205 Id. § 227 cmt. c, e.
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risk, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s.206 Another problem was
liability under hindsight bias. Because the prudent person standard
applied to each investment on an individual basis, trustees could be
held liable for the poor performance of any particular investment, not-
withstanding the performance of the overall portfolio.207 Thus, to
accommodate MPT, diversified portfolio investing, and stock invest-
ments more generally, the prudent investor standard became the
norm.208 In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, critics of the
new prudent investor standard have argued that it substantially
increased the risks for investors, who would have been better off
under the old prudent person standard and perhaps even under the
“legal lists” of the nineteenth century.209 Nevertheless, the prudent
investor standard remains the ascendant legal standard today. Its
defenders have argued that it has provided superior returns.210
The shift to analysis of the overall investment portfolio under the
prudent investor rule does not mean that investor employment is irrel-
evant. Rational diversification strategies are not “fund only”; they
account for investor employment. For example, ordinary prudent
investors would include technology stocks in a diversified investment
portfolio, but technology workers would rationally reduce their invest-
ment exposure to the industry because they are exposed to it through
their jobs.211 If one were to myopically assess these tech workers’
diversification strategies based on their portfolios alone, one might
incorrectly conclude that their portfolios were poorly designed
because they underweight the technology sector.212 In addition,
206 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 198, at 4–5 (citing this as one of the
criticisms leveled against the prudent man rule during the late twentieth century).
207 See id. at 4 (describing judicial applications of the prudent man rule that searched ex
post for evidence that an investment was too risky when made).
208 See id. at 5–7 (describing the gradual repeal of the prudent person rule and
enactment of prudent investor statutes in several states, and the widespread adoption of
the PIR after the publication of the relevant sections of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS (1992) and the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994)).
209 See Joshua Getzler, Fiduciary Investment in the Shadow of Financial Crisis: Was
Lord Eldon Right?, 3 J. EQUITY 1, 16, 19, 23–24 (2009) (describing the effects of the shift
from the prudent person rule to the prudent investor rule); see also Stewart E. Sterk,
Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine?, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 851, 867–79 (2010) (critiquing modern prudent investor doctrine).
210 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 198, at 24 (praising the “brilliance” of the
prudent investor rule).
211 Id.; see also ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDÉN, COMING UP SHORT: THE
CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 97 (2004) (describing the “considerable latitude” afforded to
defined contribution plans to invest in company stock despite ERISA’s imposition of an
otherwise forceful duty to diversify).
212 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 198, at 9 (explaining that the breadth of
diversification decreases a portfolio’s risk).
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ERISA has long recognized departures from diversification require-
ments for Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and 401(k)s.213
To own stock in the company that employs you is to concentrate your
investments, not diversify them. But ESOPs and even 401(k) invest-
ments in the employer have been justified on several grounds,
including “encourag[ing] saving for retirement and . . . support[ing]
employee stock ownership.”214 Such plans have also been criticized
because they lead to underdiversification.215 They lead employees to
be doubly exposed to their employers—through their jobs and their
investment portfolios—and also to unduly concentrate their invest-
ments in one company.216
Regardless of one’s perspective, the larger point is that rational
investors do not ignore their employment income when making
investment decisions, and nothing in the prudent investor rule or the
prudent person rule contradicts that point. Moreover, it can hardly be
argued that the member-first view results in an undiversified invest-
ment portfolio. As has been repeatedly observed, one can construct a
diversified investment portfolio with thirty to forty stocks.217 None-
theless, the fund-first view requires pension fiduciaries to practically
ignore their participants’ and beneficiaries’ jobs when making invest-
ment decisions on their behalf, a position which a rational investor
would never take with her own money.
The justification for the fund-first view must therefore arise from
two basic concerns about fiduciary capitalism: (1) Fiduciaries might
invest in their own interests, rather than those of their beneficiaries—
213 See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 211, at 97 (ERISA exempts many plans from
diversification requirements and employer stock ownership limits).
214 Id. A version of ESOPs has also been proposed as a solution to the challenge of
outsourced labor. Robert Hockett, Toward a Global Shareholder Society, 30 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 101, 102 (2008).
215 See Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 104 F.3d 105, 106 (7th Cir. 1997) (“This
novel incarnation of syndicalism [the ESOP] has been criticized for
underdiversification . . . .”).
216 Joseph Blasi, Michael Conte & Douglas Kruse, Employee Stock Ownership and
Corporate Performance Among Public Companies, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 60, 61
(1996) (“Because it ties employee income and wealth to company performance, employee
ownership has often been viewed as a means to improve productivity and performance by
decreasing labor-management conflict and encouraging employee effort, cooperation, and
information-sharing.”); see MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 211, at 95 (criticizing ESOPs
and 401(k) investments in the employer because such investments cause “participants [to]
hold an asset closely correlated with their earnings” rather than diversifying). But see id.
(noting managers’ preference for matching employee contributions in stock rather than in
cash because doing so supposedly aligns the interests of the employees with those of the
company).
217 Meir Statman, How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio?, 3 J. FIN. &
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 353, 362 (1987) (concluding that a diversified portfolio requires
thirty stocks for a borrowing investor and forty stocks for a lending investor).
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therefore, their discretion must be constrained by narrow fiduciary
obligations—and (2) fund participants and beneficiaries may have
diverse economic interests, and the simplest way to navigate those
diverse interests is to focus on the one they all share: the fund itself. I
have already addressed the duty of loyalty concerns above.218 I elabo-
rate upon why the agency costs of public pension funds counsel in
favor of a member-first view below in Part II.A. I addressed the
second concern in the duty of impartiality section above in this Sub-
part, and do so further below in Part I.E. The bottom line of these
arguments is that neither the prudent man nor the prudent investor
standard leads to a fund-first view of fiduciary duty, nor is the fund-
first view justified by standard agency cost analysis.
E. Even Under a Fund-First View, the Investment Impact of
Layoffs and Future Hiring Should Be Evaluated by
Trustees in Making Investment Decisions
Before assessing the law and economics arguments below in Part
II, I conclude with an alternate argument: Even under a fund-first
view, trustees should consider participants’ jobs in making investment
decisions. Public pension funds do not hire and fire workers for their
plan sponsors, and nothing in this Article suggests that they should.
Such decisions should be made by the state, county, and municipal
entities that must retain the authority to make employment decisions
based on their needs and budgets. Nevertheless, those employment
decisions directly affect public pension funds by altering employee
and employer contributions and the funds’ long-term assets and liabil-
ities.219 In an ideal pension world, such decisions would have no
impact on the fund’s health because pensions would be fully funded
by employers and employees as they work, and thus hiring decisions
would make no difference to the health of the fund.220 In such a
world, new employees would neither improve nor harm a fund’s finan-
cial health.221
The real world is more complicated. Terminating employees
reduces the flow of employee and employer contributions to the
218 Supra Part I.A–B.
219 See, e.g., Bandt v. Bd. of Ret., San Diego Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys., 136 Cal. App. 4th
140, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (citing pension fund actuary’s assertion that job losses could
negatively impact the pension fund itself); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RET. ADM’RS &
CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE, EFFECTS OF PENSION PLAN CHANGES ON
RETIREMENT SECURITY 4 (2014), available at http://www.nasra.org/files/JointPublications/
Effects%20of%20Pension%20Plans%20on%20Retirement%20Income.pdf (discussing
employer’s need to provide supplemental pension savings when hiring new employees).
220 Fornia Interview, supra note 95.
221 Id.
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funds, and reduces the funds’ long-term liabilities.222 Eliminating jobs
in their entirety affects future hires and future cash flows, which can
be problematic for several reasons. Even if plans may benefit from
layoffs when the benefits are more generous than the contributions,223
plans may have generational bulges and depressions. They may
become imbalanced, with relatively few participants paying into a
system compensating many retirees or conversely with many partici-
pants paying into a system with few retirees. Moreover, employers
must often make a contribution to fund a percentage of any current
unfunded liability when making a new hire.224 Thus, hiring and firing
of workers may be relevant to the fund’s financial health for asset
allocation and cash flow reasons.225 And, as noted earlier, this factor is
likely to become more important over time as the recent wave of pen-
sion reforms has increased participant contributions to funds nation-
wide while simultaneously lowering benefits—or at least not
increasing them.226
There are other reasons why sponsor employment decisions
matter to the fund. As pension funds contract, they lose efficiencies
222 See, e.g., Yaccino & Cooper, supra note 81 (“When [Detroit] shrank its work force
[over the prior six decades], it left fewer current workers to contribute to pension funds
that still had to pay benefits that were earned by large numbers of older retirees who had
served Detroit when it was a bigger city.”).
223 Some argued that because most fund assets are comprised of investment income, the
retirement benefit always outweighs employer and employee contributions. See, e.g.,
NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE ADM’RS, PUBLIC PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT RETURN
ASSUMPTIONS 1–2 (2014), available at http://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/
NASRAInvReturnAssumptBrief.pdf. (“[I]nvestment earnings account for a majority of
revenue for a typical public pension fund . . . .”). But this argument has been strongly
criticized by actuaries who argue that almost all of that investment income is simply the
time-value of money. See Fornia Interview, supra note 95. And, as noted in the text above,
recent reforms have increased the importance of employee contributions to the funds.
Supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
224 Fornia Interview, supra note 95; see also Keith Brainard, Public Pension Funding
101: Key Terms and Concepts, BENEFITS MAG., Apr. 2013, at 28, 28–33, available at http://
www.nasra.org/files/Articles/Benefits101-1304.pdf (describing the accounting and funding
requirements to cover unfunded pension liability).
225 Fornia Interview, supra note 95.
226 Supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text; see also Jack M. Beerman, The Public
Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 89 (2013) (suggesting that restrictions imposed
by contractual obligations of public pension funds should not prevent reforms intended to
close loopholes that encourage abusive pension spiking); Richard E. Mendales, Federalism
and Fiduciaries: A New Framework for Protecting State Benefit Funds, 62 DRAKE L. REV.
503, 541 (2014) (advocating for an emergency backup fund of state public pension funds
where the backup fund would be funded in part by member contributions); Amy B.
Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its Impact on Public Pension
Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1034–35 (2012) (noting that, in many states, legal
restrictions and legal uncertainties appear to take certain reform options off the table);
Secunda, supra note 194, at 6, 26 (discussing increasing contributions without parallel
increases in benefits, and using Wisconsin state pensions as an example).
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and economies of scale.227 Larger funds may obtain better investment
returns.228 Their investment expenses tend to be lower because man-
agers may reduce fees to manage greater sums of capital, and they can
spread their costs over a larger base of contributors.229 Conversely, as
pension funds shrink, their operational expenses become a larger frac-
tion of pension assets.230
Each of these factors varies by fund, depending on its size, its
funding level, and its generational bulges and depressions. What is
clear is that while funds do not and should not involve themselves
directly in employment decisions, they may make investments that
any reasonable trustee knows or should know could have a substantial
effect on such decisions. It may well be the case that the investment is
prudent and loyal because its return on investment, diversification,
and liquidity characteristics outweigh the negative impact on the fund
of layoffs and permanent elimination of jobs, or even because
refraining from the investment will do nothing to protect employee
jobs because other investors will fill the void. But to the extent that its
employment impact actually harms the fund, such an investment may
also be imprudent and disloyal. This cannot be known if the employ-
ment impact is not assessed.
According to the 2008 Bulletin, plan trustees should consider
“diversification, liquidity, and risk/return” when making plan invest-
ments.231 In most situations, this guidance is entirely appropriate. But
investment decisions made by fund trustees that affect participant
employment may have a reasonably foreseeable impact on the flow of
participant and employer contributions to the fund, and therefore on
the fund’s health. Thus, trustees considering the impact of an invest-
ment on participant contributions (and future liabilities) by assessing
the jobs impact of an investment act consistently with the duty of loy-
alty because they make that investment “solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of (i)
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries . . . .”232
227 Fornia Interview, supra note 95; see also John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown,
Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 620–21
(2001) (discussing general acceptance that economies of scale exist in the fund context).
228 Fornia Interview, supra note 95; see also CalPERS Says it Spent $139 Million on
Costs in 1996, 9 Andrews Pension Fund Litig. Rep. 10 (1998) (indicating that CalPERS’
costs were 30% less than similar multi-billion dollar funds).
229 Fornia Interview, supra note 95.
230 Id.
231 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2013).
232 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012).
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II
CRITIQUING THE TRUST LAW MODEL FOR PUBLIC
PENSION FUNDS: A COMPARATIVE AGENCY
COST ANALYSIS OF TRUSTS, PRIVATE
PENSIONS, AND PUBLIC PENSIONS
In this Part, I step away from textualist arguments to consider the
law and economics of trusts as compared to employee benefit plans
generally and public pension funds in particular. In doing so, I engage
the literature that assesses the agency costs that trust law was designed
to address. Briefly, agency costs are the costs to the principal of hiring
an agent.233 Because the principal and the agent have different inter-
ests, and because the agent may have more information, the principal
may have difficulty in monitoring the agent to make sure that the
agent is acting in the principal’s interests.234 Legal scholars have
applied agency cost analysis to a broad array of institutions and legal
doctrines to deepen understanding of those institutions and the laws
that are designed to govern them. Of particular relevance to this
Article is agency cost analysis that has been applied to corporations
and corporate law and to trusts and trust law. Here, I argue that the
agency costs of public pension funds are different from those of the
private donative trust, and even from the private pension funds
ERISA was actually designed to regulate. Thus, application of trust
law and ERISA in the public pension context ought to be done with
sensitivity to the differing sets of costs these bodies of law should
address. In particular, I argue that a member-first view of the duty of
loyalty does not raise the same agency cost concerns in the public pen-
sion context that more broadly-interpreted duties might in the trust or
even the private fund contexts.235
Four aspects of public pension funds distinguish them from trusts
generally or private ERISA funds: (1) Unlike the corporate sponsors
of private pension funds, the state and municipal sponsors of public
pension funds are not subject to the market for corporate control and
are not merged into or acquired by other entities; consequently, it is
not necessary for the legal architecture to guard against the agency
233 LUCIAN BEBCHUCK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 15–16 (2004)
(discussing the concept of agency costs and its impact on levels of executive
compensation).
234 Id.
235 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 38, at 1116 (“The stricter fiduciary rules of trust
law mimic the contractual terms that the settlors and trustees would have agreed upon if
the costs of negotiating and enforcing such contracts were zero.”).
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costs that manifest in the mergers and acquisitions context;236 (2) in
contrast to private trusts, public pension funds operate in public where
they can be more easily monitored (though perhaps they are not sub-
ject to as much disclosure and monitoring as they should be);237 (3) for
many funds, pension fund participants and beneficiaries may elect
representative peers to serve on fund boards of trustees, reducing the
types of monitoring concerns one might ordinarily face in a private
trust;238 and (4), public pension fund members also contribute to the
fund, unlike private trust members—they are donors in addition to
being beneficiaries. The fourth distinction matters less for the agency
cost analysis than it does for the point that these conflicted invest-
ments inflict a dignitary harm on members.239 For the first three rea-
sons, some of the ordinary agency cost concerns one might find in a
private trust or even a private pension plan may not exist in the public
pension context, or exist in different form. Therefore, the shift from a
fund-first to a member-first view of the duty of loyalty raises fewer
agency cost concerns in the public pension context than it might
elsewhere.
A. The Problem of Applying Trust Law to Employee Benefit Plans
Generally and Public Pension Funds in Particular: Insights
from Agency Law and Corporate Law
ERISA’s own legislative history acknowledges that the statute’s
application of trust law to employee benefit plans is problematic
because trusts differ from employee benefit plans:
[R]eliance on conventional trust law often is insufficient to ade-
quately protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.
This is because trust law had developed in the context of testamen-
tary and inter vivos trusts (usually designed to pass designated prop-
erty to an individual or small group of persons) with an attendant
236 Manne, supra note 39, at 117–18. The market for corporate control has often been
thought to lower agency costs, although that view has been challenged. The absence of
such a market for public pension fund control might raise the agency costs of public
pension trustees.
237 See Romano, supra note 40, at 822 (describing the public nature of public pension
fund operations).
238 See Hess, supra note 41, at 195–98 (2005) (describing how the political independence
and direct financial interest in the plan of member trustees enables them to focus on
beneficiary interests); Romano, supra note 40, at 821 (characterizing the correlation
between improved pension fund performance and elected beneficiary board members as
consistent with literature indicating correlation between corporate performance and
management owned equity).
239 See infra Part III.A.1.a (explaining that the basis for the divestment approach is the
idea that the funds contributed by members should not be used in ways that are offensive
to them or harmful to their interests).
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emphasis on carrying out the instructions of the settlor. . . . [T]he
typical employee benefit plan, covering hundreds or even thousands
of participants, is quite different from the testamentary trust both in
purpose and in nature.240
Scholars have described and reinterpreted the trust form in terms
of agency costs.241 Discussing trust law in terms of agency costs poses
some problems because trustees are not necessarily agents.242 Still,
agency cost analysis has provided one framework within which to
understand trust law and compare it to other bodies of law. Such anal-
ysis has been used to explain why trust law has stricter fiduciary duties
than, for example, corporate law, a discussion which offers insights
here.243 Trusts and corporations differ in several respects. For
instance, there is no secondary market for the residual claims of bene-
ficiaries of a trust because “spendthrift” clauses bar beneficiaries from
alienating their trust interests.244 In contrast, shareholders of a pub-
licly-held corporation may exit by liquidating their holdings in secon-
dary markets.245 Trust beneficiaries have little or no say over
trustees.246 This restriction is designed to effectuate the will of the set-
tlor.247 In contrast, shareholders, at least theoretically, may vote out
corporate directors.248 In this respect, pension funds are more similar
240 H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 12 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649–51;
see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (“ERISA’s standards and
procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the common law
of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection. . . . Consequently, we believe that
the law of trusts often will inform, but will not necessarily determine the outcome of, an
effort to interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties.”).
241 See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 621, 638–48 (2004) (discussing agency costs in the trust context); Reid K. Weisbord,
Social Security Representative Payee Misuse, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1257, 1280–82 (2013)
(same).
242 See FRANKEL, supra note 68, at 5–6 (discussing the differences between trust and
agency and noting that trust law places greater restrictions on trustees than agency law
does on agents).
243 E.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency,
28 J. CORP. L. 565, 570–71 (2003); Fischel & Langbein, supra note 38, at 1115–16.
244 Sitkoff, supra note 243, at 570 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 (2003);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152–53 (1959)).
245 Id.
246 Id. at 571.
247 Id. (explaining that the prohibition on beneficiaries’ alienation of their interests and
lack of ability to replace trustees operate to ensure that the will of the settlor is achieved).
248 See id. (pointing out that beneficiaries cannot easily replace trustees). But see
Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1051–52 (2007) (noting that
corporations do not squarely fit the traditional model of agency relationships at common
law, because corporate boards, although acting as agents with fiduciary duties to the
principals—the shareholders—are not controlled by them throughout the relationship).
Note that unlike trust law, ERISA does have a provision for the replacement of trustees.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012) (codifying ERISA section 409 and stating that ERISA
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to the corporate model than the trust law model, in that they allow for
removal of trustees.249 Trusts also operate largely in private,250 in con-
trast to public corporations which are publicly scrutinized and have
extensive disclosure obligations under the securities laws.251 Here,
too, pension funds bear a closer resemblance to corporations than to
trusts because they have public disclosure requirements.252 Because
trusts operate in private and trust beneficiaries have no market check,
no effective exit, and no ability to hire or fire the trustees, trustees
wield greater power over beneficiaries than do corporate CEOs and
boards over shareholders.253 Consequently, strict fiduciary duties play
a more important role in policing trustee behavior than in the corpo-
rate context.254 For example, as Robert Sitkoff has pointed out, trans-
actions in which a trustee has engaged in self-dealing are
automatically voided, and there is “no further inquiry” into whether
trust beneficiaries were harmed by the transaction.255 In contrast, cor-
porate officers who engage in self-dealing transactions have not per se
violated their fiduciary duties.256 The lack of meaningful checks on
trustee power explains the stricter fiduciary duties that apply to
trustees.257
fiduciaries can be removed for breach of fiduciary duty); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139 (1985) (noting that under ERISA section 409(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1109(a), a fiduciary may be removed for a violation of section 411 of ERISA); Best v.
Cyrus, 310 F.3d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a plan’s trustee has a duty to secure
all funds due to the plan and that a breach of this duty allowed for his removal under
ERISA).
249 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012) (codifying ERISA section 409).
250 Sitkoff, supra note 243, at 570.
251 See id. (“[I]f managers install a weak system of internal governance and in so doing
expand their opportunities for mal-, mis-, or nonfeasance, then the price that investors will
be willing to pay for the firm’s securities will fall accordingly.”).
252 See, e.g., ERISA Form 5500 (2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2013-
5500.pdf (requiring annual report of administration, participation, and categorization
information for employee benefit plans, including pensions); Peralta v. Hispanic Bus. Inc.,
419 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a fiduciary is required to go beyond even
the extensive reporting requirements in ERISA in notifying and informing beneficiaries);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing the annual
detailed reports mandated by ERISA and the DOL’s broad authorization to study,
analyze, and research employee benefit plans).
253 Sitkoff, supra note 243, at 570–71.
254 Id. at 571.
255 Id. at 573.
256 Id. (“Under the no-further-inquiry rule, even if the self-dealing transaction is
objectively fair, the beneficiaries need only show the existence of the trustee’s self-interest
in order to prevail. Once the beneficiaries prove the fact of self-dealing, there is ‘no further
inquiry’ and the transaction is voided.”).
257 See id. at 572 (“Applied here, the fiduciary obligation is a crude substitute for the
mechanisms of market efficiency that cause prices to reflect all available information and
so underpin the rationality of shareholder passivity in the corporate context.”).
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Thus, altering the fiduciary duties that apply to trustees risks
undermining an important check on trustee behavior. One should
consider the possible costs and benefits of reinterpreting the duty of
loyalty to encompass a member-first view. One advantage of the fund-
first view is that it confines trustees to a narrow objective by which
their performance is measured: fund performance.258 This narrow con-
straint helps police trustee misbehavior because it limits discretion
and therefore the potential for abuse and malfeasance.259 Expanding
the duty of loyalty to the interests of participants and beneficiaries,
rather than the fund alone, arguably expands trustee discretion and
the potential for trustee misbehavior.
Although this expanded discretion may not be inherently suspect
if the current narrow rule can be shown to undermine the interests of
fund participants and beneficiaries, it may still have disadvantages.
Under the guise of expanded discretion via a broader duty of loyalty,
trustees could justify departures from performance benchmarks by
pointing to investments that may have earned subpar returns but were
justified on the basis of reduced negative employment prospects for
fund participants. The impact of investments on participant jobs, and
in particular the avoided negative impact on jobs, might be difficult to
measure or detect, particularly by someone who does not serve on the
board of trustees and may not have access to all of the relevant infor-
mation at the time of investment. Hence, there is some risk that
trustees could abuse the expanded discretion of a member-first view.
Consider one context that is inapplicable to public pension funds
but is frequently cited as justification for the fund-first view, in which
a member-first rule might risk this type of abuse: mergers and acquisi-
tions.260 Company A offers to acquire Company B, aiming to reduce
labor costs by downsizing Company B employees. Company B’s man-
258 See supra notes 15–23 and accompanying text (introducing and describing the basic
function of the fund-first view).
259 Sitkoff, supra note 243, at 572.
260 See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,870 at 5–7 (Jan. 23, 1992) (opining that the
consideration of “non-financial employment-related factors” by the trustee of an employee
stock ownership plan may be used by management as an “antitakeover device” and
constitutes a form of “social investing” unauthorized by the exclusive benefit rule of the
Internal Revenue Code). Two commentators described the latter statement by the I.R.S.
assistant general counsel as being “unsupported by meaningful analysis.” Richard A.
Gilbert & Greg R. Riddle, Economically Targeted Investments, or “Doing Good Without
Being ‘Done In,’” Q219 ALI-ABA 189, 204 (1993). It is ultimately DOL’s position on the
interpretation of the exclusive benefit rule that matters. See Richman, supra note 74, at
234–35 (noting that the IRS must give the DOL the opportunity to block any action
disqualifying a plan for violating the exclusive benefit rule, and that IRS General Counsel
Memoranda are not necessarily binding or precedential under Section 6110(j)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code).
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agement opposes the merger; several managers sit on the board of the
company pension fund. Company B’s manager/trustees could direct
the pension fund to acquire shares of Company B and vote those
shares against the merger, ostensibly (perhaps actually) in the inter-
ests of protecting the jobs of Company B employees, who are partici-
pants in the fund.261 If consideration of fund participant jobs is
irrelevant to the fiduciary analysis or would itself be considered a
breach of fiduciary duty, then the risk that corporate managers could
use the fund as an entrenchment mechanism is almost eliminated.
Diversification and liquidity considerations alone might rule out such
an investment.
Still, the concerns raised in the mergers and acquisitions context
might not be enough to justify the fund-first view, even for private
pension plans. It remains the case that purchasing stock in Company
B to fend off a merger that would result in fund participant down-
sizing might be in the best economic interests of fund participants and
beneficiaries, even accounting for the potentially unattractive risk/
return, diversification, and liquidity prospects of such an investment.
Presumably, proper analysis of the jobs impact of the investment
alongside these more traditional components of the investment anal-
ysis could identify the best economic interests of fund participants and
beneficiaries while remaining within the constraints of a broader duty
of loyalty, and the duties of prudence, impartiality, and diversification.
Of course, agency costs are potentially high here, and corporate man-
agers interested in entrenching themselves might abuse their positions
as fund trustees to secure an investment by the fund that is not in the
best interests of fund participants and beneficiaries.262
But these types of conflicts regularly manifest in the corporate
context.263 Corporate law has developed ways of coping with them
261 See, e.g., Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that
corporate pension trustees violated the duty of prudence in directing the pension fund to
purchase shares in the sponsoring company to help fend off a hostile tender offer).
Importantly, the court did not find that this action constituted a breach of the duty of
prudence per se, but rather, that the fiduciaries failed to conduct “sufficient inquiry into
the facts upon which they based their decisions.” Id.
262 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (finding that a corporation that acted
as both employer and fund manager violated ERISA fiduciary duties by transferring
money-losing divisions from one subsidiary to another and tricked employees into
forfeiting benefits by joining transferred divisions); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,870, at 1 (Jan. 23, 1992) (“A provision in a trust agreement violates the exclusive benefit
rule of section 401(a)(2) for purposes of plan qualification where the trustee is allowed to
consider non-financial employment-related factors in the tendering, voting and handling of
securities.”); Fischel & Langbein, supra note 38, at 1138–42 (discussing conflicts in the
context of a takeover bid).
263 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 38, at 1140–41 (explaining the conflict between
younger and older employees in mergers, namely that younger employees’ future income
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short of blanket rules that bar entire sets of transactions. For example,
Delaware law provides enhanced protections for minority share-
holders faced with a buyout offer from a controlling shareholder.264
The agency-cost concerns of controlling shareholder acquisitions are
well-known. Controlling shareholders have access to inside informa-
tion; they may time the acquisition to favor their own interests and
thereby squeeze out minority shareholders, opportunistically
depriving them of future benefits of ownership.265 Also, the board of
directors—the typical shareholder agents—may be compromised by
conflicts of interest and poorly positioned to vindicate the rights of the
minority shareholders.266 One solution to this dilemma would be to
create legal rules that effectively bar an entire class of transactions—
in this case, controlling shareholder acquisitions. But such a ban
would also deprive shareholders of the potentially profitable opportu-
nity of receiving a premium for the shares from a controlling share-
holder, who may have perfectly legitimate reasons to make an offer.267
Corporate law has opted to thread the needle by permitting such
transactions while requiring greater protections for minority share-
holders in controlling shareholder acquisitions.268
Similarly, there are protections short of the fund-first view that
could safeguard the economic interests of plan members in transac-
tions like the hypothetical one described above. For instance, one
could require that only employee representatives be eligible to
derives more from employment than investments and the opposite is true for older
employees).
264 David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical
Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38
DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 922–23 (2014).
265 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116–17 (Del. 1994) (citing
Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990)) (setting out
the policy rationale for applying the higher “entire fairness” standard to controlled
mergers).
266 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (stating that business
judgment deference does not apply in a controlled merger, and overruling precedent to
that effect; in a controlled merger, the burden is on the acquirer to show entire fairness).
267 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 785, 787 (2003) (discussing control premium).
268 There are other examples of how corporate law has accommodated apparently
conflicted transactions. For example, in 1880, contracts between a corporation and its
directors were “voidable at the instance of the corporation or its shareholders, without
regard to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction.” Gordon, supra note 42, at 92
(quoting Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 36 (1966)). But thirty years later, this rule was dead. As Gordon
explains, “the courts realized that the relaxed rule permitted the parties to save on
transaction costs. Buyer and seller could use their corporate connection to find one
another and to gain quick access to reliable information . . . . In short, the relaxed rule
appeared to be more efficient.” Id.
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approve such an investment, and that they must do so unanimously
after a thorough fiduciary review that concludes that the investment is
in the best economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries,
and that it is consistent with the duties of impartiality, diversification,
and prudence. One could also require independence criteria for those
who vote on the investment. The fundamental point is that there likely
are creative options short of a de facto ban on such transactions that
could maximize the economic interests of fund participants and
beneficiaries.269
Whether these potential agency costs justify a blanket rule
requiring trustees of target company pension plans to ignore jobs of
target plan participants in making a defensive investment is a question
for another article. The relevance of the discussion to this Article is
simply to illustrate that a primary justification for the fund-first view is
not applicable to public pension funds, which are not merged or
acquired. Plan members do not need the law to protect them from
nonexistent harms, particularly when the purported legal protection
hurts them in other ways.
It is true that public pension funds may face different sets of
agency costs from those of private trusts or private pension plans.
Having politicians on one’s board of trustees introduces a host of
potential concerns, including the risk of politicians seeking to use the
funds to advance their own interests or those of constituents who are
not fund beneficiaries. Research shows that public pension funds that
have a critical mass of beneficiary board members outperform funds
that are dominated by politicians.270 These member trustees are either
invested in the fund or currently collect benefits from it as retirees.
They have skin in the game, and as a consequence, they are in a better
position than the typical trust beneficiary to monitor trustee con-
duct.271 They can check the behavior of non member trustees, like
269 See Beeferman, supra note 189 (arguing that plan sponsors should be able to
consider workers’ interests in the enterprise associated with the pension fund).
270 Hess, supra note 41, at 216–17 (“[Member-elected trustees] are motivated,
accountable to plan beneficiaries, and independent of political influence. . . . Member-
elected trustees’ dedication to their duties also appears to be beneficial to plan financial
performance.” (footnote omitted)); David H. Webber, Is “Pay-To-Play” Driving Public
Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2031, 2069–70 (2010) (“[B]oard members who are elected by plan participants and are
themselves fund beneficiaries are likely to be less susceptible to political influence or
pressure because their personal retirement funds are at stake and their positions do not
depend on the good graces of state officials.” (quoting Romano, supra note 40, at 820)).
Private pensions also have employee representatives, and may face similar job conflicts,
like pension investment in outsourcing.
271 See Hess, supra note 41, at 198 (arguing that member trustees incentivized by direct
financial interest may improve fund performance); Romano, supra note 40, at 821
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politicians and their appointees, either by outvoting them or by calling
attention to their potentially self-interested behavior, at least when it
comes to making plan investments.272 Under either a member-first or
fund-first view, funds may be better off with beneficiary board mem-
bers than without them, and most boards do have at least some bene-
ficiary members. But the benefits of member-first outlined above are
not automatically negated by the presence of politicians; on the con-
trary, the example of the Florida Retirement System’s investment in
Edison Schools illustrates at least one way that political agency costs
could be reduced under a member-first view. If anything, such costs
counsel in favor of reducing political influence over boards, not
favoring a fund-first over a member-first approach.
In sum, the typical agency cost concerns for private trusts as well
as private pension plans should not prevent a transition from a fund-
first to a member-first view of fiduciary duty. An assessment of the
types of costs associated with public pension funds in particular does
not alter this conclusion.
III
IMPLEMENTING A MEMBER-FIRST VIEW OF THE DUTY OF
LOYALTY AND ASSESSING ITS PRACTICAL EFFECTS
The purpose of shifting from a fund-first to a member-first view is
to properly prioritize the economic interests of plan members in the
making of investment decisions. As I have argued above, the fund-
first view undermines the original purpose of the duty of loyalty and
the exclusive purpose rule by demoting these interests to maximizing
return on investment for the fund. Currently, funds following the 2008
Interpretive Bulletin consider prospective investment returns, diversi-
fication, liquidity, the prudence of the investment, its impartiality as
between participants and beneficiaries, and whether it complies with
the fund-first view of fiduciary duty.273 Under a member-first view of
fiduciary duty, fund trustees would assess all of these factors along
with the prospective jobs impact of the respective investments.274 My
(characterizing the correlation between improved pension fund performance and elected
beneficiary board members as consistent with literature indicating correlation between
corporate performance and management-owned equity); see also Webber, supra note 270,
at 2069–70 (adopting Hess and Romano’s corporate performance analogies to contend that
beneficiary board members will better oversee and regulate board activity).
272 Hess, supra note 41, at 198.
273 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2013); see also supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text
(discussing the investment standards laid out in the 2008 Bulletin).
274 See supra Part I.C (discussing the inadequacy of the “investments of equal value”
rule, namely that it requires trustees to find an investment of equal value before
considering the jobs impact as a deciding factor).
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argument favoring a member-first view does not concede that fund-
first is currently the law, only that fund-first is the ascendant view of
the law. This Part assesses the practical effects of a shift to a member-
first view of fiduciary duty. I argue that this shift will alter the infor-
mation environment, creating conditions that will require greater
awareness and disclosure of investments by public pension funds in
companies that compete with their members. Alteration of the infor-
mation environment alone could change investment behavior.
Once this information environment is enriched, funds will likely
find that they are either currently invested in companies that have an
impact on their members’ jobs, or that they may prospectively make
investments that have such an impact. A fund should still proceed
with an investment that may have an adverse jobs impact unless the
adverse impact outweighs the comparative advantages of the
investment.
Under a member-first view, funds would have three possible
responses to these investments: (1) they could exit investments that
violate the member-first standard; (2) they could hold such invest-
ments and engage investee management in an effort to reduce the
investments’ negative jobs impact; or (3) they could proactively select
investments that enhance participant jobs and/or the number of
employee-contributors to the fund.275 Of course, all three options may
be exercised in combination. In many instances, fund investments will
have no impact on participant employment, and consequently, no
analysis is necessary beyond what funds normally undertake under a
fund-first view. But for investments that implicate participant employ-
ment, the member-first view could have a dispositive impact on asset
allocation, as discussed in Part I.C. In this Part, I discuss what this
assessment should look like, and how it should be applied.
A. How a Shift to a Member-First View of Fiduciary Duty Alters
the Informational Environment in Which Investment
Decisions Are Made
Under a member-first view, fiduciaries making investment deci-
sions will be required to assess the potential impact on participant
jobs. The most efficient way for public pension funds to comply with a
275 Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Large Shareholder Trading and Takeovers: The
Disciplinary Role of Voting with Your Feet 1 (Univ. of Mich., Ross Sch. of Bus., Job
Market Paper, 2005), available at http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/workingpapers/pdf/2006-07-011
.pdf; see also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21, 30 (1970) (identifying customers’
stoppage of purchasing a firm’s products as a type of “exit” and customers’ expression of
dissatisfaction to management as “voice”).
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member-first duty of loyalty would probably be to institute con-
forming investment policies. The basic principle is straightforward:
Fund investments should be designed to prioritize the advancement of
the economic interests of fund participants and beneficiaries. Gener-
ally, fund trustees do not directly assess every investment.276 Instead,
they establish investment policies implemented by internal investment
staffs, outside investment managers, or some combination of the
two.277 Under a member-first view, these policies would require funds
to account for the participant jobs impact of fund investments. In the
first instance, investments that could affect jobs must be flagged for
assessment. Once identified, those making the investment decision
will have to account for that jobs impact, either by assessing it them-
selves, requiring disclosure of the investees’ assessments, or some
combination of the two. The bottom line is that funds will need to
analyze the potential jobs impact of the investment, which requires
disclosure and appraisal of the relevant information.
Because funds are not currently required to take jobs into consid-
eration, jobs-harming investments are often made without the knowl-
edge of the fund trustees or the investment staffs, and may only be
discovered when angry fund participants discover these investments
on their own—if they are discovered at all.278
The mere disclosure of the potential jobs impact of an investment
could itself alter investment behavior. Investment staffs or outside
investment managers might be more inclined to seek out investments
that enhance participant employment, or to avoid investments that
harm it.279 Businesses that compete with public employees for their
jobs and that depend on funding from public pension plans might sua
sponte explore ways to minimize their negative impact on participant
jobs. With public pension plans operating under a member-first view,
such businesses would have a direct economic incentive to make their
276 See Dianne Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of Pension
Fund Activism, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 301 (1999) (describing the existence of investment
staffs and managers responsible for implementing investment fund policies).
277 Id.
278 See Taibbi, supra note 31 (describing a union campaign against investment in private
ambulance companies).
279 Outside investment managers are particularly eager to please large institutional
clients like public pension funds; these managers are compensated not only on the basis of
fund performance, but also by total assets under management; asset shifts by public
pension clients from one outside investment manager to another may substantially affect
the managers’ compensation. See Daisy Maxey, How to Pay Your Financial Advisor,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2011, at R1 (stating that compensation based on a percentage of total
assets under management has been the prevailing method of compensating financial
advisors and noting that “[a]dvisers have a strong incentive to boost client returns, because
their fees increase as the assets grow—and fall if the assets decline”).
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business plans more friendly to plan participants when seeking
funding from public pensions.280
Still, it should be noted that, while the disclosure of relevant
information might alter investment behavior, it likely cannot vindicate
a member-first view on its own. The next question is how funds should
respond to investments that harm (or help) participant jobs once they
are aware of this impact. There are three potential responses: exit,
voice, and proactive jobs creation.
1. Exit or Screening
Assume that a fund identifies an investment that harms partici-
pant jobs, and this harm more than offsets the superior expected
returns of such an investment. One response might be to exit from the
investment, or to decline the prospective investment in favor of
another that is more likely to advance the economic interests of plan
members. One consideration is whether exit could actually reduce the
negative jobs impact on plan participants, or whether another indif-
ferent investor might fill the investment void. This may depend on the
investment context—whether it is a private equity investment, a pri-
vate placement, or an exchange-based securities transaction in highly
liquid secondary markets.281 Often, limited partners in private equity
investments have limited exit (and voice) rights.282 But some public
pension funds have become more sophisticated about private equity
investments, demanding separate investment accounts rather than
limited partnerships, thereby maintaining greater say over their
investments than they would have as limited partners.283 Even limited
partners in private equity investments may retain leverage over inves-
tees, to the extent that the latter are interested in obtaining capital in
the future from the limited partners. In contrast, exit from exchange-
traded investments is comparatively easy, but this same ease of exit
may undermine its effectiveness because of the high probability that
another investor will step in and minimize the harm of exit to the
280 This depends, in part, on how easy it would be to replace public pension funding with
other sources of funding. For more on this, see infra Part III.A.1–2.
281 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 275, at 26–27 (describing the possible failure of the exit
option in market contexts that indicate a high level of liquidity).
282 Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence from
Private Equity, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4–5 (2004) (describing the role of limited partners in
private equity funds).
283 E.g., Lisa Parker, Investors Looking to Invest in Private Equity via Separate Accounts
– October 2014, PREQIN (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.preqin.com/blog/101/10025/pe-via-
separate-accounts.
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investee.284 In some cases, exit could have no effect or even be
counterproductive, leading a fund to sacrifice the superior returns of a
jobs-harming investment while gaining no jobs protection for its
participants.
Shareholders employ a range of exit strategies, from boycotts and
divestment campaigns to the “Wall Street Walk.”285 Institution of a
member-first view bears some resemblance to these strategies, but it
also differs from them in substantial ways, potentially limiting their
applicability to implementation of the view. The basic intuition behind
exit strategies is that they succeed because they depress the target’s
price or value.286 By reducing the pool of capital available to the
target, or by creating downward pressure on asset prices, exit
increases the target’s cost of capital, makes it more vulnerable to take-
overs, or harms managers who own stock of declining value.287
Whether exit works in practice is a matter of extensive debate.288
The exit option may be limited for public pension funds, which are
large, diversified funds that employ passive investment strategies
284 See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, SHOULD PUBLIC PLANS ENGAGE IN SOCIAL INVESTING? 5
(2007) (using the Vice Fund, which invests in alcohol, tobacco, and firearms companies, as
one example of the presence of an alternate investor that could undermine the
effectiveness of divestment efforts).
285 See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder
Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2645 (2009) (examining
“whether a large shareholder can alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and
shareholders through the credible threat of exit on the basis of private information”); Siew
Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch & C. Paul Wazzan, The Effect of Socially Activist Investment
Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott, 72 J. BUS. 35
(1999) (arguing that divestment is ineffective because investors who are indifferent to the
targeted issue fill the void created by activist investors who choose to divest); Jayne
Elizabeth Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk: The Changing Face of
Corporate Governance, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 43, 45–47 (1998) (discussing the transition
from divestment to strategic voting and direct communication as the method by which
pension funds seek to influence corporate decision-making); Eric Hendey, Does
Divestment Work?, HARVARD U. INST. POL., http://www.iop.harvard.edu/does-divestment-
work (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (discussing divestment as a means of influencing
companies to adopt renewable energy strategies and using the South African divestment
campaign as an example of the political effectiveness of divestment).
286 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 275, at 22–23 (discussing the assumptions underlying the
presumed effectiveness of exit strategy, including the analogy to supply, demand, and price
dynamics).
287 See id. (discussing the assumptions underlying the presumed effectiveness of exit
strategy, including the analogy to supply, demand, and price dynamics); Gopalan, supra
note 275, at 32–40 (discussing increased susceptibility to takeover as an effect of
divestment).
288 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 275, at 26 (describing circumstances under which exit
would fail to harm investees); Gopalan, supra note 275, at 7–8 (discussing increased
susceptibility to takeover as an effect of divestment).
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across large segments of their portfolios.289 Diversification require-
ments may limit the extent to which the funds can credibly threaten
exit, although some funds have exercised the exit option in the past.290
Certain funds may be more capable of exiting from private equity
investments than from investments that are part of their indexing
strategies. Additionally, exit may harm the investee, but it may harm
the exiting investor too, who could be hurt by declining prices caused
by its own departure.291 A final potential weakness of exit is that it
may not work if other investors are willing to step in to support the
price.292
Whether exit succeeds may depend on several factors, including
the investment context, the amount of capital exiting, and the exit
strategy, that is, whether it is a boycott-type exit that leaves no room
for voice and is broadly targeted, or a narrower, “Wall Street Walk”
exit that allows for voice and is target specific. Below, I analyze boy-
cotts and the Wall Street Walk, and explain why I think the latter may
be the more appropriate choice.
a. Boycott or Divestment
There is some skepticism about the economic effectiveness of
divestment among finance academics. For example, although the
famous South Africa boycott over apartheid may have played a role in
increasing the salience of the racist practices of that society, rallying
the victims and bringing moral suasion to bear upon its practitioners,
at least one study has suggested that it was ineffective in that it failed
to cause economic harm to its targets.293 Similar claims have been
made about divestment from Sudan, tobacco companies, and firearms
289 See Benjamin J. Richardson, Can Socially Responsible Investment Provide a Means
of Environmental Regulation?, 35 MONASH U. L. REV. 262, 272 (2009) (observing that
divestment campaigns narrow the investment pool and may impede diversification,
therefore increasing risk).
290 See Michael Sicilia & Ricardo Duran, CalSTRS Statement on its Decision to
Divest of Certain Firearms Holdings, CAL. ST. TCHRS.’ RETIREMENT SYS. (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.calstrs.com/statement/calstrs-statement-its-decision-divest-certain-firearms-
holdings (discussing CalSTRS’s decision to divest from firearms companies).
291 See Martin B. Meznar, Douglas Nigh & Chuck C.Y. Kwok, Effect of Announcements
of Withdrawal from South Africa on Stockholder Wealth, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1633, 1641
(1994) (finding that firms that announced their divestment from South Africa experienced
a 5.5% decline in stock price in the days following the announcement).
292 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 275, at 26 (noting that exit could fail if a target firm
acquires new customers as it loses old, exiting ones).
293 See, e.g., Teoh et al., supra note 285, at 79–83 (“We find no support for the common
perception . . . that the anti-apartheid shareholder and legislative boycotts affected the
financial sector adversely. . . . [It] had no discernible effect on the valuation of banks and
corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets.”).
The authors also entertain the possibility that “the boycott primarily reallocated shares and





      12/19/2014   13:53:46
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\89-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 69 19-DEC-14 11:58
2174 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:2106
companies.294 The Vice Fund is a notorious example of how boycott
efforts can be undermined: The fund was created to invest in alcohol,
tobacco, and firearms companies at least partly in response to divest-
ment campaigns targeting those industries. The theory behind the
Vice Fund is that it targeted companies that were both profitable and
undervalued because of the boycotts against them.295 The arguable
ineffectiveness of divestment campaigns could be due to the costs of
implementing the boycotts themselves.296
Boycott or divestment is one potential approach to the problem
of public pension funds investing in companies that compete with
their members for jobs. Funds could simply bar investments in such
companies. One basis for such a boycott is rooted in the idea that
public pension fund investments in companies that privatize public
employee jobs inflict dignitary harm against fund members.297 Mem-
bers are forced to contribute to the funds. Therefore, the funds should
not harm their interests or be used in ways they find offensive. Thus,
even if these investments are economically beneficial to fund mem-
bers, they could still be avoided because of the dignitary harm caused
by the investment.298 Similarly, the divestment approach could be jus-
tified as a form of socially responsible investing. For example,
according to a report issued by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
(Freshfields Report), which offers a summary of fiduciary law as it
applies to environmental, social, and governance investing globally,
operations from ‘socially responsible’ to more indifferent investors and countries,” which
would offer some support for voice and engagement strategies over exit. Id. at 83.
294 See Luke A. Patey, Against the Asian Tide: The Sudan Divestment Campaign, 47 J.
MOD. AFR. STUDS. 551 (2009) (arguing that efforts by groups in the United States to
encourage divestment from Sudanese oil companies have failed in part due to the
ambivalence of Asian governments and the investment funds that they run, which are
willing to fill the investment gap).
295 See MUNNELL, supra note 284, at 5 (“The ‘Vice Fund,’ which was established in
September 2002, specializes in only four sectors—alcohol, tobacco, arms, and gambling,
and thus stands ready to buy the stocks screened out of standard portfolios.”).
296 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 275, at 86 (describing the boycott mechanism as costly
to both sides); Maria O’Brien Hylton, “Socially Responsible” Investing: Doing Good
Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) (describing
boycotts).
297 See, e.g., FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME FINANCE
INITIATIVE 96 (2005) (“[W]e think there is a strong argument that there will be a class of
investments that could be reasonably offensive to the average beneficiary . . . . [T]he types
of investment that might fall into that class include investments that are linked to clear
breaches of widely recognized norms . . . .”).
298 Id. (“[The] statement that investment powers must be exercised in the beneficiaries’
best interests is taken to mean that . . . trustees may take into account the broader interests
of beneficiaries, beyond merely their financial interests.”).
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fiduciaries may exclude investments that could “reasonably be
assumed offensive to the average beneficiary” on the basis of “clear
breaches of widely recognized norms, such as international conven-
tions on human rights, labour conditions, tackling corruption and
environmental protections.”299 DOL’s interpretation of ERISA
appears to foreclose such an approach, allowing these considerations
only after trustees first conclude that the investments are of equal
value.300 But other sources of U.S. law allow fiduciaries to take into
account social considerations—and the purpose of the trust itself,
which is to provide benefits to fund participants—when making
investment decisions.301 I do not favor the boycott approach to the
jobs issue addressed in this article, but a version of it has been
adopted by at least one fund in the United States, the Ohio Public
Employees Retirement System (OPERS), which maintains an invest-
ment policy that comes close to boycotting privatizing investments.302
The OPERS investment policy states:
OPERS does not aim to promote privatization of public sector jobs
through its Private Equity investment program. It is highly unlikely
that OPERS Private Equity investments would be in partnerships
that are dependent on privatization strategies. In evaluating private
equity partnerships, the Staff shall use its best efforts to limit cir-
cumstances where privatization may have an adverse actuarial
impact on OPERS. If such limitation is not possible, the Staff shall
seek guidance from the Board prior to committing to such a
partnership.303
This near-boycott approach has some support under international
fiduciary standards, although it is more difficult to reconcile the
OPERS policy with a view of fiduciary duty that focuses exclusively
on economic interests.304 Boycotts bar consideration of the potential
economic benefits of such investments to fund members and to the
299 Id. But note that the Freshfields Report, in discussing United States law, pointedly
observes that “[t]here appears to be no bar to integrating [environmental, social, and
governance] considerations into the day-to-day process of fund management . . . provided
the focus is always on the purposes or beneficiaries of the trust and not on securing unrelated
objectives.” Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
300 Id. at 110.
301 See Michael Wines, Stanford to Purge $18 Billion Endowment of Coal Stock, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2014, at A15 (noting that Stanford University’s internal investment
guidelines permitted it to consider whether “corporate policies or practices create
substantial social injury” when selecting endowment investments).
302 See OHIO PUB. EMP. RET. SYS., PRIVATE EQUITY POLICY (2014), available at
https://www.opers.org/pdf/investments/policies/Private-Equity-Policy.pdf.
303 Id. at 7.
304 See Edward J. Waitzer & Douglas Sarro, The Public Fiduciary: Emerging Themes in
Canadian Fiduciary Law for Pension Trustees, 91 LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN
163, 191 (2012) (citing FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, supra note 297).
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fund itself.305 Such investments might be in the economic interests of
public employees, even accounting for their potentially negative
impact on participant jobs. Moreover, as discussed more fully below,
boycotts do not allow for the exercise of voice, and so substantially
reduce the possibility of constructive engagement with investees.306
There is no reason for investees to consider modification of their busi-
ness plans to reduce the negative impact on public sector jobs if the
only investors in these businesses are indifferent to this impact. Per-
haps businesses that compete with public employees for their jobs will
never meaningfully reduce their negative jobs impact. But assuming
that voice might work, the boycott approach could plausibly increase
the risk that participants would lose their jobs to private sector com-
petitors because exiting or boycotting retirement funds have no lev-
erage over these competitors. It could be the case that the boycott
approach is the best way to vindicate the economic interests of fund
members if the following conditions are always true: the negative jobs
impact of investments in these companies outweighs their expected
return and other investment attributes, boycotts actually cause eco-
nomic harm to their target that outweighs the harm to the boycotter,
and voice is ineffective. It is unlikely that all three of these conditions
always hold.
Still, in fairness, the boycott policy does speak to the emotional
resonance of this issue for many fund members, the deeply felt sense
that these investments constitute a breach of trust even if they do not
directly violate a governing legal principle. But even the emotional
resonance of the issue may not be enough to lead funds to implement
boycott policies. In a prior study, I examined, among other things, the
socially responsible investment criteria of the largest fifty-three public
pension funds by asset size.307 Only nineteen of fifty-three (36%)
maintained any socially responsible investment criteria.308 Among a
separate set of funds, each of which participated as a lead plaintiff in a
securities class action, and might therefore be expected to be more
activist than the average fund, just twenty-five of seventy-eight (32%)
maintained socially responsible investment criteria.309 This raises
305 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 275, at 30 (“[Boycott] is undertaken for the specific and
explicit purpose of achieving a change in policy on the part of the boycotted
organization . . . .”).
306 See id. (contrasting exit and voice on the basis that the latter, but not the former,
involves an ongoing relationship with the target firm); Hylton, supra note 296, at 11
(contrasting boycott with other forms of activism aimed at persuading a firm to alter its
objectionable behavior).
307 Webber, supra note 270, at 2068 tbl.9.
308 Id.
309 Id.
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questions about the prospects for actual implementation of boycott
policies over privatizing investments at United States public pension
funds. It also points to a potential advantage of adopting a member-
first view. A member-first view, depending on the source of the legal
authority that adopts it, has the potential to apply to all funds because
it has the potential to become compulsory. In contrast, the boycott
approach is likely to remain voluntary, adopted by some funds and
not others, and therefore applicable to a smaller pool of capital and
less likely to be effective than adoption of a member-first view.
b. The “Wall Street Walk”
The “Wall Street Walk” is another form of exit. In theory, inves-
tors can discipline managers by selling their stake in a company if they
are unhappy with it, usually because of dissatisfaction with company
performance.310 Some studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of
exit as a tool for instituting corporate governance reform; exit may
depress prices and increase liquidity, thereby making public compa-
nies more vulnerable to hostile takeovers.311 Depressed prices may
also punish managers whose compensation is tied to share price.312
For repeat players, both investors and investees, exit may have down-
stream effects by souring relations between the parties, thereby inhib-
iting future deal making. More broadly speaking, there is a debate
within the finance literature as to whether stock prices are sensitive to
demand, though the most recent evidence suggests that they can be.313
As with the divestment discussion above, these studies rely on a
variety of assumptions not present here, including assumptions about
investor access to private information or a unified interest in maxi-
mizing share price. The studies also tend to focus on exit from one
target company. Here, a member-first realignment would require exit
or voice decisions to be made across a comparatively large swath of
310 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 275, at 4, 21–25 (describing the exit option as “uniquely
powerful”).
311 See Gopalan, supra note 275, at 32–40 (discussing increased susceptibility to
takeover as an effect of divestment).
312 See Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 285, at 2646–47 (arguing that when manager
compensation is linked to stock price, the existence of shareholders with a large enough
stake to impact stock price upon exit can help to reduce agency costs); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1277, 1326–27 (1991) (describing incentive compensation as a means of giving
investment managers a stake in performance and reducing agency costs).
313 ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 22 (2000) (citing Jeffrey Wurgler & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Does Arbitrage
Flatten Demand Curves for Stocks?, 75 J. BUS. 583, 600 (2002)) (analyzing chart that
measures the cumulative abnormal returns, and the demand shock, of stocks added to the
S&P 500).
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companies. Still, a realignment towards a member-first view of fidu-
ciary duty is about properly prioritizing the economic interests of fund
participants and beneficiaries, not offering a public statement of dis-
approval for these companies by barring investments in them. Conse-
quently, it requires funds to decide whether the expected returns from
such companies offset the potential or actual job losses, or the likeli-
hood that those jobs might be lost anyway, even without the fund’s
investment. In this respect, funds must calculate what they believe to
be in the actual economic interests of their members, which bears a
closer resemblance to the analysis that takes place in the Wall Street
Walk context than the divestment context.
Analyzing the potential jobs impact of an investment presents a
challenging estimation problem. How could a fund determine if exit
would plausibly save member jobs? The numbers analysis likely
requires some estimation of how exit would increase the investee’s
cost of capital, reduce manager (or investment manager)314 compensa-
tion, and how this might deter harm to member jobs. There are sev-
eral components of the analysis. If possible, trustees, or investment
staffs, should look to prior actions of the investee, or to companies
that perform similar services, and assess the extent to which public
employee jobs were terminated as a result of the investee’s business.
They should also request investee assessments of the jobs impact and
independently examine the investee’s business plan to make an
independent assessment of the potential impact, if possible. Trustees
or investment staffs should compare the jobs impact of these busi-
nesses to other potential investees, along with the comparative risk
and expected rates of return, diversification, and liquidity properties
of the investments. Trustees and staffs could assess other sources of
capital for the potential investees, in particular, what other funds that
adopt a member-first view might be investing in or exiting. Trustees or
staffs might assess the extent to which their own exit (and that of
other funds) increases the costs of the potential project or otherwise
alters it, and how exit might negatively affect the investee. To the
extent that the practice of exiting under a member-first view becomes
common, trustees could observe whether investees improve the terms
of post-exit capital investment, or whether they scale back their jobs-
harming projects. Experience may show that, at some point, the cost
of capital could rise high enough to force the investee to change
course, particularly if the investors are empowered under a member-
first view to articulate terms under which they would be willing to
314 For a discussion of the impact of the member-first view on investment managers, see
infra notes 327–32 and accompanying text.
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invest, i.e., to exercise voice. It may become apparent over time that
exit is only effective when a certain level of capital exits, which may be
connected to the exit of particularly large or influential funds. Outside
investment managers may play a valuable role here, and to the extent
funds utilize them, it would make sense to consult them. They may be
more intimately familiar with how the investee and companies like the
investee are likely to price their capital needs.
The effectiveness of exit depends on how much capital exits. Exit
by one small fund would be unlikely to have the desired result. Exit by
a larger fund would increase the impact. Exit by a group of public
pension funds, large and small, would make it even more likely that
the investee harm would be substantial enough to alter the investee’s
course, perhaps by raising the investee’s cost of capital enough to
thwart its ability to underbid public employees for job contracts. Any
one fund’s exit decision315 might be determined by its assessment of
whether other funds will also exit.
Because trustees’ fiduciary duties run only to their own fund’s
members, one might conclude that they could never exit an invest-
ment that harmed the jobs of participants in other funds. But that is
incorrect. Trustees need not wait until the investee is actively bidding
against their own fund’s members for jobs before assessing the poten-
tial jobs impact of the investment. For example, the Middlesex County
Retirement System could exit an investment because, hypothetically,
that investment harmed jobs in neighboring Norfolk County.316 Rea-
sonable Middlesex trustees do not have to wait until Aramark actually
submits a bid to privatize Middlesex member jobs before assessing the
potential jobs impact on Middlesex’s own members of the fund’s
investment in Aramark. Although Middlesex trustees owe no fidu-
ciary duty to the members of the Norfolk County Retirement System,
they can look to the experience of other counties and make reason-
able assessments about the investee’s potential to harm the jobs of its
own members, so long as it plausibly believes that the investee will
eventually challenge its own members’ jobs. Similarly, the $176.8 bil-
lion New York State Employees Retirement System (NYSERS)317
could exit an investment that harmed jobs for members of the $294.7
315 For simplicity, I discuss only the exit option here; I discuss the alternative “voice”
approach below in Part III.A.2.
316 For purposes of this hypothetical example, I set aside the more complicated analysis
of the role of the MassPRIT in these investments.
317 Pension Fund Overview, OFF. ST. COMPTROLLER (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/snapshot.htm.
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billion California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS)318
so long as it based that calculation not on the harm to CalPERS mem-
bers, to whom NYSERS trustees owe no duty, but on the potential
harm to NYSERS members.319 So could any other public pension
fund in the state of Massachusetts or in the country that credibly
believed that Aramark or other privatizing companies could compete
for jobs against its own members. These observations suggest two
important points about implementing a member-first view: It becomes
more effective as it becomes more widely adopted, and it could poten-
tially redirect substantial sums of capital in ways that could vindicate
the actual economic interests of fund members in fund participant
jobs.
The potential effectiveness of this tactic does not assure its cor-
rect deployment, which undoubtedly is based on challenging estima-
tion problems. But that is merely a difference in degree, not in kind,
from the challenging estimation problems that funds and many busi-
nesses face daily. Assessing the expected returns of investments
involves consideration of a complicated array of factors and involves
estimations of future events. Corporations regularly make investment
decisions which may be intimately connected to worker employment
by assessing the costs of such decisions and their effect on competi-
tors. Liability for such decisions is rarely, if ever, conditioned upon
whether the trustees correctly predicted the future.320 That type of
standard would lead to liability under hindsight bias. Instead, the lia-
bility regime governing such decisions is more often focused on
whether the decision-makers undertook a thorough process in
reaching their decision.321 Although some decisions to exit or hold the
investment might be so obviously incorrect as to constitute breaches
318 Current Investment Fund Values, CALPERS (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.calpers.ca
.gov/index.jsp?bc=/investments/assets/mvs.xml.
319 It should be noted that if public pension trustees of separate funds colluded with one
another to avoid investing in companies that harm each other’s workers, they could raise
antitrust concerns. But unilateral actions that merely parallel the actions of other funds are
substantially less likely to be actionable under antitrust laws, barring evidence of collusion.
See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007) (holding that a claim of
antitrust violation requires more than a showing of parallel action; actual evidence of
collusion must be shown).
320 See Kathleen Paisley, Public Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation of
Trustee Investment Decisions, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 188, 221–22 & n.211 (1985)
(indicating that the business judgment rule does not apply to pension fund trustees, but
that courts apply an equally deferential standard that declines to second guess trustees’
decisions except in cases of obvious abuse); see also, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383
N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (offering a traditional iteration of the business judgment
rule—that mere error on the part of directors is not grounds for liability in negligence),
aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976).
321 FRANKEL, supra note 68, at 171–72.
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of fiduciary duty, in most cases, courts will likely look to the proce-
dures undertaken by trustees or investment staffs in making the
investment decision.322 Courts would likely want to see that trustees
engaged in the right inquiry, asked the right questions, consulted the
right sources—as described above—and reached a reasonable conclu-
sion, even if it turned out to be the wrong one.323
An investment decision based on benefits to the fund alone could
constitute a failure to invest “solely in the interests of participants and
beneficiaries, and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits,” if,
in a relevant context, it failed to account for the investment’s jobs
impact.324 Such an investment decision could have been made in the
interests of third parties or outside investment managers, who are
compensated on the basis of returns and not harmed by job losses.325
Such an investment might also violate the duty of care for failing to
adequately account for the interests of fund participants and benefi-
ciaries.326 It may be the case that some funds, on account of their
322 E.g., Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 729 F.3d 1110, 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2013) (focusing on the
procedure by which plan fiduciaries arrived at the challenged decisions); see also Shaver v.
Operating Eng’rs Local 428 Pension Trust Fund, 332 F.3d 1198, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that allegations of failure to follow proper accounting procedures sufficed to plead
breach of fiduciary duty even absent showing of loss).
323 See, e.g., Tibble, 729 F.3d at 1128, 1130 (applying the abuse of discretion standard
and explaining that courts take into account the fiduciaries’ explanations of their decisions
and other factors related to the reasonableness of the fiduciaries’ decisions).
324 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
325 See, e.g., In re Fairchild Indus., Inc. & GMF Invs., Inc., ERISA Litig., 768 F. Supp.
1528, 1533–34 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss for violations of the exclusive
purpose rule and the duty of care when plaintiffs alleged that defendant used employees’
vested funds to purchase stock in a company of which he was a creditor); DeMott, supra
note 248, at 1056 (noting that punitive damages also may follow upon an agent’s breach of
the duty of loyalty); see also Langbein & Posner, supra note 92, at 102 (“[T]he trustee’s
duty of loyalty exists solely for the protection of the trust beneficiary, and it is equally
violated whether the trustee breaches for the trustee’s enrichment or that of a stranger.”).
326 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (establishing duties of care, skill, prudence, and
diligence for fiduciaries of federal pension funds), with CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(a)–(d)
(mirroring ERISA’s exclusive purpose and prudent man rules, as well as a duty of
diversification), FLA. STAT. § 215.47(10) (2011) (requiring public pension fund trustees to
comply with the fiduciary duties in ERISA), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11:263(A)–(B) (2009)
(requiring Louisiana public retirement system trustees to follow the prudent man rule), id.
§ 11:834(B) (requiring Louisiana public retirement system trustees to follow the exclusive
purpose rule), N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 502(3) (McKinney 2014) (requiring the New York state
teachers’ retirement system to follow the exclusive purpose rule as stated in ERISA), 71
PA. STAT. ANN. § 5931(a), (e) (West 2014) (requiring Pennsylvania public pension trustees
to comply with the prudent man and exclusive purpose rules), TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 825.101 (West 2014) (mirroring ERISA’s exclusive purpose rule), and Bd. of Trs. of the
Vill. of Barrington Police Fund v. Dep’t of Ins., 570 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(noting that the Illinois Pension Code is analogous to ERISA and applying ERISA’s
prudent person standard). See also DeMott, supra note 247, at 1056–57 (noting that, in an
action for breach of fiduciary duty, a showing of “but-for” causation typically required in
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small size or other factors, conclude that exit will rarely work for
them. They could then opt to follow a de facto fund-first approach
under the member-first umbrella, at least when it comes to exit. They
could still opt for voice strategies, conveying their preference to the
investee to spare participant jobs when reasonable, even if the effec-
tiveness of voice might be limited by the small absolute size of the
investment. If nothing else, such voice strategies—which are con-
strained under the fund-first view—will still vindicate the dignity
interests of fund participants who may be offended by these
investments.
There is a final point to be made under this analysis. The pres-
ence of investment managers arguably enhances the leverage of public
pension funds, particularly large funds, in making both exit and voice
decisions. In the direct investment context, exit’s effectiveness
depends in part on the exiting investor’s ability to indirectly impact
the investee: If exit reduces share prices or increases the cost of cap-
ital, it may be effective.327 In the investment manager context, exit’s
effect is immediate and direct. Investment managers are compensated
under two metrics: fund performance and total assets under manage-
ment.328 Any reduction in assets under management harms the man-
ager. True, it is always possible that the exit of one public pension
fund client, or even a reduction of that fund’s assets maintained with
the manager, can be replaced by other clients. But this process is
sticky, costly, and not as fluid as it might appear to be on a theoretical
level. Fund managers invest large sums in client recruitment and
retention. For instance, whole categories of funds, called feeder funds,
exist for no apparent reason other than to funnel highly coveted
investment clients into particular investment managers.329
Anecdotally, investment managers appear to be eager to avoid
exit by their pension fund clients. In one high-profile example, Black-
stone, a large investment manager, issued a strong statement of sup-
tort actions is not necessary and that it suffices to show that an agent’s disloyal conduct was
a substantial factor in an outcome adverse to the principal and also pointing out that it is
no defense for an agent to assert that he fulfilled his duties of performance despite his
disloyal conduct).
327 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 275, at 21–24 (discussing the assumptions underlying the
presumed effectiveness of exit strategy, including the analogy to supply, demand, and price
dynamics, and the effect of a drop in share price on management behavior).
328 See Illig, supra note 73 (noting that many fund managers are paid according to
benchmarks and total assets under management).
329 See John D. Rea, Brian K. Reid & Kimberlee W. Millar, Operating Expense Ratios,
Assets, and Economies of Scale in Equity Mutual Funds, 5 INVESTMENT COMPANY INST.
PERSP. 1, 3 n.5 (1999) (collecting studies).
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port for public pension funds.330 It did so shortly after the New York
City Employees’ Retirement System, a large client of Blackstone’s,
cancelled a planned meeting with the firm over concerns with the
firm’s stance on public pension funds.331 As the Wall Street Journal
pointed out, “[a]bout $37 of every $100 of Blackstone’s $111 billion
investment pool comes from state and local pension plans.”332 Thus
public pension fund leverage over investment managers may enhance
the effectiveness of exit and voice in the member-first context and
may have potent downstream effects for investees who hope to turn to
such funds for capital.
2. Voice or Engagement
A second option for funds facing an investment that has attrac-
tive characteristics, but harms or threatens to harm fund participant
jobs, is to exercise voice. Rather than exit, funds could maintain their
investments and seek to reduce their negative employment impact.
They could urge the investees to minimize the number of participant
jobs negatively impacted by the investment, and to avoid future action
that would further harm participant jobs. The intuition behind voice is
closely connected to exit.333 Investees eager to avoid investor exit and
its costs may be willing to meet investor demands regarding their busi-
ness practices, particularly where the cost of meeting those demands is
less than the cost of exit or the cost of a hostile but engaged share-
holder.334 One influential fund, the California State Teachers Retire-
ment System (CalSTRS), maintains voice policies that they apply in
the limited context of public-private partnerships.335 Arguably, such
policies could be applied more broadly than just the public-private
partnership context. The CalSTRS policies state that, in the context of
330 Michael Corkery, Blackstone Group Loves Public Workers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20,
2011, 10:03 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/01/20/blackstone-group-loves-public-
workers/. The statement reads, in part: “We oppose scape-goating public employees by
blaming them for the structural budget deficits that cities and states face.” Id.
331 Id. (noting that, one year earlier, a high-profile Blackstone advisor had publicly
described state workers’ benefits as “too generous”).
332 Id.
333 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 275, at 36–37.
334 See id. (describing exit as a “last resort” after voice has failed, and the balancing of
prospects of each method that may affect shareholders’ decision to pursue one method
over the other to influence companies). Shareholders can exercise leverage even if exit is
not a meaningful option. They can push for seats on the board of directors, vote against
executive compensation packages, seek out hostile buyers, etc.
335 CALSTRS, TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT BOARD POLICY MANUAL, at M-13 (2012),
available at http://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/boardpolicymanual_5
.pdf. The policy applies “in circumstances where the investment vehicle is working with a
state, local or municipal agency to establish public-private partnerships (‘PPPs’) or to bid
on public offers for the sale, lease or management of public assets.” Id.
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public-private partnerships, the investment staff must secure a written
agreement from the managers of the domestic investment vehicle that
states that “the investment vehicle shall make every good faith effort
to recognize the important role and contribution of public employees
to the development and operation of such assets.”336 In so doing, “the
investment vehicle shall make good faith efforts to ensure that such
transactions have a de minimis adverse impact on existing jobs.”337
Although these policies are admirable, phrases like “good faith
efforts” and “de minimis adverse impact” may be broad enough to
permit the adverse impact to be ignored in practice. Consider how
under a member-first view the adverse jobs impact becomes part of
the primary investment calculus—in effect, it counts against the
expected return of the investment. Therefore, it no longer suffices for
the investment staff to ask the investee to make good faith efforts to
minimize the negative jobs impact of the investment. By deducting the
negative jobs impact from expected returns—in other words, by pri-
oritizing the actual economic interests of fund participants and benefi-
ciaries in the investment—the investment staff must believe that the
investment will still outperform competing investments once the
adverse jobs impact is taken into account. If it turns out that the
investment underperforms competing investments under the new
analysis, then voice looks quite different. It is no longer about asking
the investee to make a good faith effort to minimize the negative jobs
impact. It is about telling the investee that, if the adverse jobs impact
is not reduced, then the fund may have to exit the investment or avoid
making it in the first place in favor of other investments that look
stronger under the member-first view. Recall that under a fund-first
view, as interpreted by DOL, exit (or voice) would violate the duty of
loyalty because it arguably harms the fund.
A skeptic would point out that there must be a tradeoff between
investment returns and protecting jobs—the privatizing investment is
profitable because it pays workers less to do the same job that was
previously performed by a fund participant. However, reducing
worker compensation may be just one component of the investment’s
profitability. It is plausible that the worker impact could be reduced
while the return on investment remains competitive. For example, to
return to where this Article began, Aramark’s Education Services
website touts its ability to achieve superior returns using the latest
336 Id.
337 Id. Interestingly, CalPERS instituted the policy in 2008 in response to a threatened
lawsuit by Professional Engineers in California Government (PECG), an organization of
CalPERS participants. Miller, supra note 31. PECG dropped its lawsuit after CalPERS
instituted the new investment policy. Id.
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cleaning and “proprietary information technolog[ies].”338 Aramark
claims that superior employee training, productivity, and perform-
ance, as well as the use of more reliable equipment with better energy
performance, drives the returns.339 These are all efficiency gains that
do not depend directly on firing public workers or paying them less,
and could presumably leave a margin of profitability even if the com-
pany complied with fund demands to reduce the negative impact of its
business on fund participants and beneficiaries. Of course, it may be
that Aramark’s extensive catalogue of efficiency claims is just hype,
that the efficiencies account for a trivial percentage of Aramark’s
profits, if at all, and that its business model depends entirely on
severely cutting worker wages and benefits (two aspects of the busi-
ness model not mentioned on Aramark’s website, but implemented in
Chelmsford, MA and Louisiana). In that case, exit may be the more
appropriate course, assuming another competitive investment is
available.
3. Proactive Job Creation
Finally, under a member-first view, public pension funds should
be able to deploy their assets to proactively preserve or create partici-
pant jobs, so long as doing so remains in the economic interests of
fund members.340 The economic interests of current participants and
retirees may well be affected not only by the ability of current partici-
pants to maintain their own jobs, but by the ability of the employer to
create future employee-contributors.341 Future hires, or investments
that maintain current employment of existing participants, lead to
contributions to the fund by such participants and contributions made
on their behalf by employers to the fund, even as they increase the
fund’s liabilities.342 Of course, such future hires could act to the detri-
ment of current fund participants, and if that is the case for a partic-
ular fund, such investments should be avoided. The discussion above
in Part I.E suggests how such hires can be beneficial: They can expand
338 Core Services, ARAMARK K-12 EDUC., http://www.aramarkschools.com/facilities/
core-services.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
339 Id.
340 See Wessel, supra note 122 (finding that in the context of ERISA private pension
plans and job creation, the primary purpose of a fund’s investment should be determined
by weighing the cost to the fund of an investment with higher labor costs against the
collateral benefits of such an investment to union members); cf. Interpretive Bulletin
Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted Investments, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,734 (Oct. 17,
2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) (“[F]iduciary consideration of non-economic
factors should be rare and, when considered, should be documented in a manner that
demonstrates compliance with ERISA’s rigorous fiduciary standards.”).
341 Supra notes 219–23.
342 Supra notes 219–23.
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the base of the contributor-pyramid to help make payments to current
retirees and they can improve economies of scale and other efficien-
cies from which all participants benefit.343
Despite all this, I am not currently aware of public pension funds
that engage in such investment strategies, perhaps in part because of
lingering uncertainty over the current fiduciary regime. Taft-Hartley
funds have made such investments, for example, in the construction
field for the purpose of increasing the hiring of construction workers
who are current plan participants, or who will become plan partici-
pants.344 As a theoretical matter, there is no reason public pension
funds might not do the same. Such investments might present eco-
nomic challenges. It may be that the comparatively high cost of public
employee labor will make such investments too unattractive to com-
pete with other investments, even accounting for their positive jobs
impact. Still, the same argument could be made about the Taft-
Hartley funds investing in projects that hire presumably more costly
unionized workers who in turn contribute to the funds.
Whether such investments make economic sense will depend on
the specifics of particular transactions. But under the ascendant fund-
first view of fiduciary duty, the jobs benefits that such transactions
could confer on fund participants and beneficiaries would be irrele-
vant to the investment analysis. Under a member-first view, the jobs
benefits to current participants and beneficiaries, as well as the fund,
will count in the primary investment analysis alongside its risk/return,
diversification, and liquidity characteristics. Such benefits are in the
actual economic interests of fund members, and they ought to be con-
sidered in the primary investment analysis.
CONCLUSION
The ascendant fund-first view of fiduciary duty requires public
pension plan trustees to exclusively consider the economic interests of
the plan in making investment decisions. This Article instead advo-
cates a member-first view of fiduciary duty, which would require fidu-
ciaries to consider the economic interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries in making fund investments. As I show, the fund-first
view can lead to investments that harm the interests of plan members,
in particular, privatizing investments that replace public employee
jobs with private sector ones. I resurrect overlooked case law to show
343 Supra notes 219–23.
344 See Wessel, supra note 122, at 355 (“Participant members of construction unions
have strongly supported the efforts of their leadership to use their pension assets to finance
job opportunities; more work means not only a steadier living wage, it also means a greater
likelihood for workers of vesting and eventually receiving a pension.”).
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that, contrary to DOL’s interpretation of the duty of loyalty and the
exclusive purpose rule, trustees are not tethered to this fund-first view
by the plain text of ERISA, which can accommodate a member-first
view. The member-first view is more faithful to the original purpose of
the duty of loyalty—to prioritize the interests of fund participants and
beneficiaries in fund investments—than is the fund-first view. Nor is
such a view disabled by concerns that it would raise agency costs of
pension trustees. Agency cost concerns are abated by the fact that
public pensions operate in public and have participant and beneficiary
board members, in contrast to private trusts. Moreover, a central pre-
occupation for advocates of the fund-first view—the agency costs of
mergers and acquisitions—are simply nonexistent in the public pen-
sion context. I argue that a member-first view still functions in concert
with the full suite of fiduciary duties that bind trustee discretion,
including the duties of impartiality, prudence, and diversification. And
I demonstrate that the member-first view may be feasibly imple-
mented to advance the economic interests of fund participants and
beneficiaries via the familiar investor tools of exit, voice, and proac-
tive jobs creation.
While the fund-first view has advantages, particularly a narrow
fiduciary obligation that enables relatively straightforward assessment
of trustee performance, its weaknesses become acute in the context of
privatizing investments. In the privatization context, the fund-first
view often undermines the actual economic interests of public
employees—the very same interests that are supposed to be priori-
tized under the duty of loyalty. Plan participants may lose their jobs or
face reduced working hours (and consequently reduced benefits) as a
result of investments made with their own retirement funds. Although
one could take an absolute approach to such investments by barring
them outright, this Article advocates a more nuanced approach. Such
investments should not be banned, but they should be assessed under
a member-first framework that accounts for their actual economic
impact on fund participants and beneficiaries. The member-first view
corrects a distortion introduced into fiduciary duty by the fund-first
view and fulfills the ultimate purpose of the duty of loyalty and the
exclusive purpose rule: to prioritize member interests in the invest-
ment of their retirement funds. Institution of this view could come
from a variety of sources, including a new Interpretive Bulletin from
the Department of Labor which would be influential, but not binding
on state pensions; clarifying pronouncements by state attorneys gen-
eral; and legal actions brought by pension fund participants and bene-
ficiaries seeking to insure that their retirement funds are invested in
their economic interests.
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APPENDIX




State Citation Same Close Language
Alabama ALA. CODE § 36-26-14(g) (2013) X
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 39.35.011 (2012) X
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-712(D) X(2014)
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-2-207 (2013) X
California CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17(a) X
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-31-901(3) X
(2014)346
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-155a(c) (2013) X
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5541 (2014) X
Florida FLA. STAT. § 122.355(2) (2013) X
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 47-1-85(a) (2014) X
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 88-22.5(a)(1) (2013) X
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. § 59-1301(2)(a) (2014) X
Illinois 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 1-109(a) X
(2014)
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 5-10-5.5-2.5(b)(2) X
(2013)
Iowa IOWA CODE § 410.3 (2014) X
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4921(1), (2) (2014) X
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.650(1)(c)(2) X
(West 2014)
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11:834(B) (2014) X
Maine
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. X
§ 21-203 (West 2014)
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32 § 23(3) X
(2014)
345 Note: This chart is not intended to represent a comprehensive account of the
exclusive purpose rule as applied to state or local pension plans in the United States. There
are other sources of fiduciary duties that apply to public pension plans that are not
referenced here. The chart’s primary purpose is to demonstrate that the exclusive purpose
rule governing a broad swath of public pension plans is either identical or highly similar to
ERISA’s exclusive purpose rule. Naturally, some judgment is required in determining the
similarity of the duties when the language differs even slightly. The final column, “Similarly
Purposed Language,” means that the rule appears to have the same basic purpose as the
others but the language differs from it. For example, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-155a(c) (2014)
requires that pension trustees abide by “strict fiduciary standards and responsibilities”
without explicitly defining them.
346 Applies to Colorado fire and police pension fund only.
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Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.1133(3) X(2014)
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 356.001(b) (2014) X
Mississippi
Missouri MO. REV. STAT. § 105.688(3) (2014) X
Montana MONT. CONST. art. 8, § 15(1) X
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-1239.01(b) (2014) X
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. § 287.430(2) (2014) X
New N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-A:15(I- XHampshire a)(a)(2) (2012)
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-5(i)-(l) (West X2014)
New Mexico N.M. CONST. art. 20, § 22(a) X
New York N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11,
§ 136-2.3(a) (2014); N.Y. EDUC. LAW X
§ 502(3) (McKinney 2014)
North N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-69.7(a)(2) (2013) XCarolina
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-52.3-03 (2013) X
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 145.11(A) X
(West 2014)
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 909.1(A)(1) X
(West 2014)
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 243.435(2) (2013) X
Pennsylvania 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5931(e) (West X
2012)
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-10-6(b)(1) (2011) X
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-16-40(2) (Supp. X
2013)
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-13-51.1 (2013) X
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-36-920(f) (Supp. X2013)
Texas TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 825.101 (West X
2012)
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 49-11-301(3) (West X
2013)
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 472a(b) (2013) X
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-124.30(C) (2013) X
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.50.780(4) X
(West 2014)
West Virginia W. VA. CODE § 5-10B-10(a) (2014) X
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. § 40.01(2) (2013) X
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-3-439(a)(ii) (2013) X
TOTAL N=48 32 12 4
